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A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus
Eve Brensike Primust
INTRODUCTION
Federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions is desperately
in need of reform.' Experts have described the current system as "chaos,"2 an
"intellectual disaster area,"3 "a charade,'A and "so unworkable and perverse that
reformers should feel no hesitation about scrapping large chunks of it."5 The
problems are easy to identify. Federal judges expend enormous amounts of
Copyright 0 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
I Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Rebecca
Eisenberg, Barry Friedman, Brandon Garrett, Samuel Gross, Randy Hertz, Don Herzog, Jerry
Israel, Orin Kerr, Nancy King, Douglas Laycock, Margo Schlanger, Gil Seinfeld, George Thomas,
Christina Whitman, Larry Yackle, and the participants at the George Washington University
Criminal Law Scholars Conference for helpful comments. Thanks also to Stefan Atkinson, Jeffrey
Jacobi, and Matthew Thome for excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2009) (arguing that the system has failed); Larry
W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542, 553 (2006) (pronouncing the federal habeas corpus system a disaster);
Marcia Coyle, Congress Looks at More Limits on Habeas, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 18
(quoting Senator Jon Kyl's statement that "[t]en years [after the most recent habeas corpus
legislation], things have gotten worse, not better"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006), state
prisoners may file habeas corpus petitions in federal court challenging the constitutionality of their
detentions and requesting release from confinement.
2. Yackle, supra note 1, at 542.
3. Id. at 553 (quoting Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1731,
1756 (2000)).
4. Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 816.
5. Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction ofDeath Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 42 (2002).
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time reviewing habeas petitions from state prisoners, but much of that time is
spent finding ways to dismiss the petitions on procedural grounds without ever
addressing their merits.6 Even when a federal court addresses the merits,
deferential standards of review all but ensure that the state conviction will
stand. In the extremely rare case where a federal court grants relief, the
judgment comes years after the petitioner was wrongly imprisoned.8 By that
point, the case has often been forgotten, and the state actors responsible for the
underlying constitutional violation have often changed jobs. 9 As a result, the
federal decision effectively has no deterrent or reform value.
The failure of federal habeas to help correct problems in state criminal
justice systems is particularly regrettable given evidence that states systemati-
cally violate criminal defendants' rights. Michigan, for example, routinely
denies indigent criminal defendants access to counsel, leaving them to repre-
sent themselves.10 Capital defendants in Idaho who discover six weeks after
sentencing that the state withheld impeachment evidence about prosecution
witnesses are statutorily barred from challenging the state's misconduct in state
court." In New York, courts routinely violate defendants' due process rights by
misconstruing state procedural rules to prevent defendants from raising
substantive federal violations.12 These are just a few examples. 13
6. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 60-63 (2007),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter "KING REPORT"]
(documenting the long processing times and noting that over 40 percent of noncapital cases are
disposed of without reaching the merits of any claim).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
8. See KING REPORT, supra note 6, at 59, 62.
9. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (discussing the "erosion of
memory" that happens with the passage of time in habeas cases); Karen J. Mathis et al., Public
Service Deserves Public Support, THE CHAMPION, June 2007, at 38 (discussing the high turnover
rates in prosecutor and public defender offices).
10. See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, "A RACE TO THE BOTTOM," EVALUATION
OF THE TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN MICHIGAN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ii
(2008) [hereinafter RACE TO THE BOTTOM]. Minnesota, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, and
Louisiana also routinely deny indigent defendants access to adequate trial representation in
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See discussion infra Section II.B. 1.
11. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2719(5)(b) (2008) (requiring any challenge to a capital
conviction or sentence to be brought within forty-two days of the imposition of the capital
sentence and not permitting a successive petition for any claim that "alleges matters that are . . .
impeaching"). Alabama has similar rules. See infra Section II.B.3. As I explain infra Section
II.B.3, these rules violate defendants' due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
12. Specifically, the appellate courts repeatedly default federal claims by holding that
criminal defendants failed to lodge contemporaneous objections to impermissible evidence even
though explicit, timely objections to the evidence are clear on the face of the trial record. See cases
collected infra notes 116 & 117.
13. See infra Section II.B for further discussion of states' systemic violations of criminal
defendants' rights.
2 [Vol. 98:1
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At least some of these systemic state violations are well known,14 as are
the problems with federal habeas.15 What has not been sufficiently appreciated,
however, is that a reformed habeas system could address both sets of problems
at the same time. As I describe below, the federal habeas system is broken
largely because of its resolute focus on individual petitioners.' 6 Reconfiguring
federal habeas to focus on systemic state violations-those that recur in a pat-
tern across multiple cases-could reduce waste and better protect defendants'
rights while showing greater respect for autonomous state decision-making.
As scholars have recognized elsewhere in public law, there is no hermetic
separation between individual rights and structural or systemic processes of
governance. To be sure, it is often helpful to focus on a question as primarily
implicating one or the other of those categories. But a full appreciation of a
structural rule includes an understanding of its relationship to individuals, and
individual rights can both derive from and help shape larger systemic
practices. The separation of powers principle, for example, is clearly a matter
of structure, but much of its virtue rests on its promise to help protect the rights
and welfare of individuals. 19 Conversely, the right to vote belongs to
individuals, but one of its most important functions is to prevent the systemic
distortion of political power. The law assigns the individual voter a right partly
to vindicate his individual interests, but the assertion of that right is also meant
to prevent the more general abuses that might follow if whole groups of voters
were excluded from the political process.20
This Article proposes that federal habeas could be profitably reimagined
along parallel lines, with the rights of individual petitioners functioning as
levers for prompting systemic criminal justice reforms. In so doing, the Article
departs from a long tradition of understanding habeas review as a straight-
forward matter of individual rights, the aim of which is to remedy legal viola-
tions that occur in particular petitioners' cases. This individualist orientation
dominates existing theories of habeas corpus, uniting those who would reform
habeas by making it more broadly available with those who have proposed
14. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 383,
401-04 (2007) (discussing systemic violations of some criminal procedure rights); Yackle, supra
note 1, at 556-57 (recognizing the prevalence of right-to-counsel violations).
15. See sources collected supra notes 1-5.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998) (illustrating how the assignment of
rights to individuals functions to limit and structure governmental processes).
18. See id.
19. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (1991).
20. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663 (2001); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and
Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (1998) (showing how the
assignment of rights to individual voters shapes election law at the collective or structural level).
32010]
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narrowing or streamlining reforms. In the former camp, scholars such as Larry
Yackle21 and Gary Peller 2 2 have advocated eliminating many procedural
barriers to federal habeas review.23 In the latter camp, Henry Friendly, 24 John
Jeffries, and William Stuntz2 5 have recommended restricting habeas petitions
that do not allege factual innocence; scholars building on Paul Bator's process
theory26 have focused on whether individuals had a fair opportunity to raise
their claims in state court;27 and still others have argued that federal habeas
should be a forum for some constitutional criminal procedure claims (such as
claims of judge or jury bias) but not for others (such as the unreasonableness of
a police search).28 On all sides, the literature is large. But from each perspec-
tive, these scholars share the assumption that the point of federal review of state
convictions should be to correct errors in individual cases. They only differ as
to which errors they think are worth correcting-process errors, guilt-innocence
errors, or errors affecting certain favored federal rights.
In its individualist form, federal habeas review has become unworkable.
At enormous expense, the system grants relief to almost nobody. The situation
is so dire that Joseph Hoffiann and Nancy King recently declared that federal
habeas review was beyond salvaging.29 Based on a comprehensive empirical
analysis of federal habeas courts,30 they propose eliminating federal habeas
entirely for most state prisoners31 and reallocating the resources currently
21. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 3.
22. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 579, 690-91 (1982).
23. Others, who liken federal habeas corpus review to a form of appeal to the federal
courts, would employ appellate standards of deference when reviewing a state court criminal
conviction. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997 (1992); Barry Friedman, A Tale of
Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247 (1988).
24. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
25. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural
Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 691-92 (1990).
26. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
27. See, e.g., Hammel, supra note 5, at 67 (arguing for a coercive quid-pro-quo model in
which the state can obtain expedited, deferential federal habeas review if it shows that there was a
full and adequate hearing in state court); Steven Semeraro, A Reasoning-Process Review Model
for Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 897, 927-28 (2004) (arguing for a
reasoning-process review model in which the federal court considers only the state court decision-
making process and asks whether the state court cited the relevant federal law and weighed the
appropriate factors when issuing its decision).
28. See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947 (2000).
29. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 793, 796-97.
30. KING REPORT, supra note 6.
31. Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 819. They exempt from their proposal those who
have never been convicted, those who claim they are in custody in violation of a new rule of
constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, those who
claim they are innocent, and those sentenced to death who want to challenge either the
4 [Vol. 98: 1
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expended on federal habeas to improve the quality of defense representation
throughout the country.32 Their proposal, like some others in the past, offers a
trade-off: reduced habeas review in exchange for increased government
funding to protect criminal defendants' rights earlier in the process. 33 At its
best, their proposal would not only save resources currently wasted in federal
habeas review but might also help redress some systemic constitutional
violations that now occur in state criminal justice systems. But their proposal
would leave many systemic violations unchecked.34
Rather than abandoning habeas review, I propose a reformed model of
federal habeas designed to reach systemic state violations of defendants'
constitutional rights. The key to that reform involves reimagining individual
petitioners as vehicles for redressing systemic or structural problems in states'
administration of criminal justice. Given limited resources, complete
relitigation of state court criminal cases on federal habeas is not feasible. 35 if
we must limit federal habeas review, we should do it on the basis of the
prevalence of the constitutional violation at issue.
More specifically, federal habeas review of state criminal convictions
should focus on whether there is a systemic state violation of criminal defend-
ants' rights. A systemic violation exists when a state actor (or set of actors)
violates defendants' rights repeatedly, such that there is a pattern of violations
across multiple cases.36 Repeated actions by a single judge or a single prosecu-
tor can create systemic problems, because judges and prosecutors are repeat
players whose customary errors affect large numbers of criminal defendants.
However, there must be a pattern of violation across multiple cases to give rise
constitutionality of the death sentence or their eligibility to receive a death sentence. See id. at
819-21.
32. See id. at 797, 823-33.
33. See id. at 797; see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 106 (1976);
James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 333-42 (2002);
Paul H. Robinson, Proposal and Analysis ofa Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments,
54 B.U. L. REV. 485, 499-500 (1974).
34. For example, routine misinterpretations of federal law by state court judges would no
longer be cognizable on habeas. State procedural rules that routinely deprive criminal defendants
of the opportunity to raise federal challenges would not be subject to challenge in habeas
proceedings. And prosecutorial misconduct claims would not be cognizable absent a
demonstration of actual innocence. See infra Section II.B. (explaining the prevalence of these
systemic problems).
35. See Yackle, supra note 1, at 553 (acknowledging that "everyone recognizes that the
Court is no longer a conventional court of error with the duty and responsibility to catch and
correct mistakes of federal law made by courts below"-in part because the Court "cannot
manage the load").
36. The state's intent when it errs is irrelevant. States are often inattentive to federal
constitutional rights for structural reasons related to their dockets and the limited resources
available to them. See discussion infra Section II.B. 1. As a result, many systemic state problems
are created unintentionally. These routine violations are often the most pernicious and should not
escape federal review merely because the state did not intend to engage in a practice that violates
the federal constitutional rights of its defendants.
2010] 5
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to a systemic violation. The number of errors necessary to establish such a
pattern will depend on how many times the state actor has encountered an
issue.37 If a state judge has incorrectly interpreted the standard for effective
assistance of trial counsel during a capital sentencing hearing six times, and
that judge has only presided over six capital sentencing hearings in which the
issue has been presented, there is a systemic problem. If that judge has presided
over two hundred capital sentencing hearings in which the issue was presented
and there have been six mistakes, there is not a systemic problem. Obviously,
there is no magic number of times that a state official must err in order to
establish a systemic problem. As with all standard-like inquiries, there is likely
to be some disagreement about the contours of the definition. The critical
distinction between a systemic violation and an isolated error is the frequency
with which the state official errs relative to the number of times that the state
official encounters the issue.
Focusing on recurring errors that create a pattern across multiple cases
would streamline habeas review in a way that would reduce redundancy,
increase efficiency, and, if properly structured, give more autonomy to state
institutions. 39 In the aggregate, such a system would also do more to reduce
violations of individual defendants' rights.
This Article contains five Parts. Part I explains why federal habeas review
of state convictions has become a waste of resources while providing almost no
real relief, even to deserving petitioners. Part II attempts to recover a lost
purpose of federal habeas review by explaining that the original
Reconstruction-era extension of federal jurisdiction to review state convictions
was aimed at a problem of systemic state resistance to constitutional rights. It
then demonstrates that the problem of systemic violations is still prominent
today-albeit with different substantive contours-and explains why habeas
review cannot correct such problems if it retains its current focus on individual
petitioners. Part III accordingly proposes a systemic model of federal habeas
review. It explains how such a model would appropriately address questions of
standing, procedural barriers to review, evidentiary burdens, remedies, and
legal assistance, all while maintaining conformity with Suspension Clause
principles. Part IV argues that the proposed reform should appeal both to those
37. Cf Batson v. Kennedy, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1985) (noting that the number of strikes
that will lead to an inference of discrimination is going to depend on the number and type of
people in the particular jury pool).
38. It does not matter whether the criminal procedure right at issue arises frequently or
infrequently across the total number of criminal cases. If there is an issue that only arises in 10
percent of criminal cases, but every time it does, the state judge violates the defendants'
constitutional rights, the state error is a systemic one.
Similarly, the magnitude of the particular error itself is irrelevant. It should not matter if a
state routinely provides ineffective trial counsel or routinely denies counsel altogether to
defendants who are entitled to counsel. Both are exampLes of systemic problems, regardless of
which is perceived of as a "worse" violation of the Sixth Amendment right.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.
6 [Vol. 98: 1
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who want to make habeas a more effective tool for preventing constitutional
violations and those who want to limit habeas review due to concerns about
conservation of resources, finality, and federalism. Finally, Part V situates the
proposed model in the literature on structural reform litigation in general,
explaining why a systemic habeas model is better suited to redress systemic
state violations than class action litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal
enforcement actions, habeas class actions, or other nonfederal or nonjudicial
alternatives.
Although I fully develop the proposed reform in Part III, a few words
about the core idea are in order here. Under the systemic habeas model, a
petitioner would have to show that his individual rights were prejudicially
violated and would also have to produce some evidence that the violation was
systemic rather than an idiosyncratic error in his case. When trying to make this
initial showing, the petitioner would often have the assistance of a Justice
Department lawyer tasked to investigate systemic state violations or a civil
rights attorney paid pursuant to a fee-shifting statute. Once the petitioner
carried his initial burden, the federal district judge would have to decide
whether a systemic problem existed. If the federal court found no systemic
problem, it would dismiss the petition. But if the court found a systemic
problem, it would order the form of relief that is traditional in habeas corpus:
conditional release of the petitioner. Specifically, the federal judge would
remand the petitioner's case to the state courts with an order documenting the
systemic problem and giving the state two options: (1) fix the problem in
whatever way the state sees fit and apply that fix to the instant petitioner's case,
or (2) release the petitioner from custody. If the state chose to release the
petitioner, all future habeas petitions from that state alleging prejudice from a
similar systemic violation would be fast-tracked in federal court. Petitioners
who could demonstrate individual prejudice in their cases as a result of the
systemic violation would have their cases sent back to the state with similar
orders until the state fixed the problem.
This model of habeas offers several important benefits, including limiting
waste, respecting state autonomy, and improving protection for the rights of
defendants. Because only claims of systemic error would be cognizable on
habeas, federal courts would no longer entertain petitions seeking relief for
individual violations. As a result, federal courts would no longer be charged
with revisiting state court decisions in the large run of ordinary cases. And
when federal courts did entertain habeas petitions, their focus would be on a
question not typically addressed in the state courts-namely, whether a state is
engaging in practices that routinely violate defendants' constitutional rights.
Although fewer claims would be cognizable under the proposed model,
the shift in focus to systemic violations would help make habeas a better
corrective for violations of defendants' rights. A model of habeas that uncovers
and redresses systemic violations would, in the aggregate, greatly reduce the
2010] 7
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incidence of individualized prejudicial error. And, as I explain in detail in Part
1II, systemic state violations are by definition circumstances under which the
state process is ineffective, so the exhaustion requirement that currently causes
excessive delay in federal habeas review would not be necessary under a
systemic model. As a result, federal habeas adjudication would move more
swiftly in those cases where it is warranted. That increased speed would
improve the feedback mechanism to the states, thus increasing the corrective
value of the federal decisions.
The nature of the remedy that federal courts would provide upon finding a
systemic violation is key to this model's ability to spur reform, protect federal-
ism, and maintain continuity with the traditional habeas process. Rather than
directly ordering structural change in a state's criminal justice system (as might
occur in a section 1983 or federal enforcement action), the proposed system
would catalyze reform through the traditional habeas remedy of releasing
prisoners, one by one. When a federal court finds a systemic violation and
sends a petitioner's case back to the state courts, the state itself decides whether
reform is in its interests and, if so, what shape that reform should take. If the
state does nothing, or does too little, it faces the threat of future petitions being
fast-tracked in the federal courts. The resulting wave of conditional release
orders that might follow would substantially increase the state's incentive to
reform. But the conditional release order allows the offending state to choose
its own approach to solving the problem, thereby maintaining the proper
balance-central to our federalist system-between state autonomy and federal
oversight. Moreover, the fact that the relief is individualized (that is, that
conditional orders of release come one by one) makes it more politically
palatable for a federal judge to grant the writ. There is no requirement of
immediate relief for all affected prisoners.
Two final notes about the scope of the proposed reform are in order. First,
the proposed systemic habeas review model is designed to replace federal
habeas review of state court criminal convictions-that is, the branch of habeas
review that occurs under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.40 1 leave for another day what
reforms should be made to the statutes that govern habeas review of federal
convictions and executive detentions.41 Those other forms of habeas review are
42
obviously important. That said, an overwhelming majority of the federal
habeas docket is comprised of state prisoner petitions.43 Second, although the
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
41. Id. at §§ 2241, 2255.
42. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantinamo, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1981 (2008); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror, " 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013 (2008); Dimitri D. Portnoi, Note, Resorting to Extraordinary Writs: How the All Writs
Act Rises to Fill the Gaps in the Rights ofEnemy Combatants, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 293 (2008).
43. In 2003 and 2004, there were a total of46,414 habeas petitions filed in noncapital cases
and nearly 37,000 of them were filed by state prisoners. See Administrative Office of the Courts,
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2004 Annual Report of the Director, tbl.C-2 (reporting that
8 [Vol. 98: 1
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proposed model of systemic review would replace individualized review in
noncapital state cases, individualized habeas review should remain available to
capital defendants. Full relitigation may not be feasible for all criminal
convictions given limited resources, but it is certainly possible, and desirable,
for the small handful of cases where the ultimate punishment is at stake."
Systemic violations affect large groups of criminal defendants, but they
are currently unaddressed by a system oriented toward individual errors. At the
same time, the project of correcting individual errors has become a morass.
This Article suggests that refocusing habeas review on systemic state practices
could both repair the broken federal habeas system and redress practices by
which states systematically violate defendants' federal rights.
I
THE BROKEN HABEAS SYSTEM
A prisoner in state custody who believes that he is being held in violation
of federal law may petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to
45 4
request release. Once referred to as the Great Writ of Liberty,46 habeas corpus
enjoyed its heyday in America during the Warren Court era.47 As the Warren
Court enforced constitutional criminal procedure rights against the states, more
state prisoners petitioned the federal courts for release, alleging that their newly
incorporated rights had been denied.48 The federal courts considered these
claims de novo and released deserving state prisoners.49
23,344 habeas petitions were filed in federal district courts in 2004 and 23,070 were filed in
2003); NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER
THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 2 (2007) (explaining that
nearly 37,000 noncapital habeas cases were filed by state prisoners in federal district courts in
2003 and 2004).
44. In this respect, I agree with other scholars who have argued that capital and noncapital
habeas corpus systems should be treated differently. See, e.g., Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at
821; Yackle, supra note 1, at 542.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
46. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 619 (1842); see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137 (referring to the writ of habeas corpus as the "stable bulwark
of our liberties").
47. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUp.
CT. REV. 65, 67, 77 (discussing the criminal procedure revolution in the 1960s and 1970s and the
ways in which it broadened the scope of federal habeas review of state criminal convictions).
48. See JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER
96, 99 (1988) (noting that state prisoners filed 871 habeas corpus petitions in federal courts in
1960 whereas prisoners filed 9,063 such petitions in 1970).
49. See, e.g., Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 446 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (noting
that "State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as
binding [because] it is precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide");
see also James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2035-36
(2000) (explaining how the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1960s "deputize[d] the entire federal
judiciary" to use habeas to enforce recently expanded criminal procedure rights).
2010] 9
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In the 1960s, with the advent of the war on drugs, states expanded their
criminal codes.50 The resulting increase in convictions, against the background
of newly incorporated criminal procedure rights, caused an explosion of federal
habeas filings.5 1 Unable to handle the volume of petitions, federal courts began
erecting barriers to review. First, they held that most Fourth Amendment claims
were not cognizable on habeas, thus eliminating a large category of claims.52
They imposed exhaustion and procedural default requirements to ensure that
habeas petitioners first presented their federal claims to their respective state
courts in accordance with the relevant state procedures. If a petitioner had not
exhausted available state court remedies or had not complied with state
procedures when raising federal claims, the federal courts would not address
the claims. 54 The federal courts then held that there was no constitutional right
to counsel for habeas proceedings,55 thus leaving many petitioners unable to
prepare and file meritorious petitions. They prohibited retroactive application
of most new criminal procedure decisions, thus preventing petitioners from
relying on new court decisions to reopen their petitions. 56 And they prohibited
most prisoners from filing successive habeas petitions.
Congress finished what the federal courts had started when it enacted the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").5 1
AEPDA codified many of the foregoing restrictions and added a few of its own,
including a one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas petitions in federal
50. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 24-25 (1997).
51. See THOMAS, supra note 48, at 96, 99.
52. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that, "where the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial" (footnotes omitted)).
53. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982) (requiring state prisoners to
exhaust all claims for relief in the state courts before presenting those claims to the federal courts);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (holding that a state prisoner whose federal claim is
not heard in state court due to his failure to comply with an independent and adequate state
procedural rule will not have that claim considered in federal court unless he can show cause and
prejudice to bypass the procedural default).
54. See Hammel, supra note 5, at 2 (describing the Burger Court's "retrenchment in habeas
review" and stating that "[t]he convergence between the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural
default now permits states to render claims permanently unreviewable . . . .").
55. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989).
56. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1989) (holding that a new rule will
generally not apply retroactively to cases that were already final and on collateral review at the
time the rule was adopted).
57. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489-90 (1991) (explaining that federal
courts should refuse to entertain successive petitions whenever the claims raised in them could
have been raised earlier, regardless of whether the failure to raise them earlier was a deliberate
choice).
58. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266 (2006).
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court.59 Perhaps most importantly, AEDPA changed the standard of review that
the federal habeas courts employed. For the few petitioners able to maneuver
through the procedural barriers and have their claims entertained on the merits,
the federal courts could only grant relief if the underlying state court decision
was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 60 Under AEDPA, it is not enough if a state court decision was wrong: it
has to have been unreasonably wrong.61
Despite these judicial decisions and congressional enactments, the volume
of federal habeas petitions has continued to rise.62 As the habeas procedural
maze has grown more complex, both the time required for petitioners to reach
federal court and the time required for federal courts to resolve the average
habeas petition have increased. What the various obstacles to review have
accomplished, however, has been to effect a shift in the subject matter of
habeas review from the substantive merits of the prisoners' claims to the
question of which procedural obstacle will be used to bounce each claim out of
federal court.64 Rather than separate the baseless claims from the valid ones,
courts dispose of many claims on procedural grounds.65 And after all this time
is spent, federal judges grant relief to noncapital habeas petitioners in less than
1 percent of cases. 66
Critically, the fact that federal judges ultimately deny almost all petitions
for relief without considering their substantive merits means that the habeas
system does not deter states from violating defendants' constitutional rights.67
State judges know that, absent egregious errors, their decisions are insulated
from federal attack. Thus, when faced with crushing caseloads, 68 the lack of
real federal review gives state judges an incentive to cut comers, which has the
effect of diluting federal constitutional rights.
59. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
60. Id. § 2254(d)(1).
61. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-11 (2000) (emphasizing that "an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law"
and holding that a federal habeas court may not issue a writ simply because it believes the state
court erred; rather, the error has to be an unreasonable one).
62. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1638 (2003) (noting
that, between 1996 and 2001, the number of federal habeas petitions that state inmates filed grew
by 50 percent, even though the state prison population increased by only 20 percent).
63. Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 806.
64. See KING REPORT, supra note 6.
65. See id. at 60-63 (explaining that over 40 percent of habeas petitions are dismissed
without considering any claim on the merits); see also Garrett, supra note 14, at 445-46 (noting
that current habeas law does not effectively sift baseless claims from meritorious ones).
66. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 809.
67. See id. at 810-15.
68. See Wayne R. LaFave et al., 1 Criminal Procedure § 1.10(c) (3d ed. 2003) (describing
the caseload problems in state courts).
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The way in which federal courts grant habeas relief further diminishes any
potential deterrent value. If a habeas petitioner successfully demonstrates that
the state court failed to provide him with an adequate hearing on his federal
claim, the federal court conducts its own hearing and decides the issue rather
than sending the case back to the state court.69 State court judges may be more
inclined to refuse to grant evidentiary hearings if they know that the federal
courts will hold hearings later and clean up the mess.70 This procedure allows
state judges to pass the buck to the federal courts and put the political burden of
making a publicly unpopular decision in favor of a criminal defendant on the
federal judge.7 1
For all of these reasons, many scholars, judges, legislators, and practition-
ers agree that the current system of federal habeas corpus review of state court
criminal convictions is broken and desperately in need of reform.72 The
problem is figuring out a remedy.
II
RESTORING A SYSTEMIC PURPOSE
In this Article, I propose restructuring federal habeas review of state court
convictions to focus on systemic violations of defendants' rights. Such a
restructuring would be consistent with one of Congress's original reasons for
extending federal habeas jurisdiction to cover state prisoners' claims-namely,
redressing the systemic and widespread violation of individual rights by states.
Restoring a focus on systemic state practices-which many other habeas
reform proposals fail to do-would greatly improve habeas as a deterrent to
such violations.
69. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) (holding that "the power of inquiry on
federal habeas corpus is plenary" and that, "[tiherefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas
corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court to which the
application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew"); 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2) (2006) (setting forth conditions under which federal habeas courts may conduct an
evidentiary hearing).
70. Cf Steven Semeraro, Two Theories ofHabeas Corpus, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1233, 1248
(2006) ("Elected state judges may be more likely to deny constitutional challenges if they know
that life-tenured federal judges are waiting to clean up the mess.").
71. See Semeraro,supra note 27, at 921.
72. See sources collected supra note 1; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 649
(1993) (White, J., dissenting) ("Our habeas jurisprudence is taking on the appearance of a
confused patchwork. . . ."); Thanassis Cambanis, Some Oppose Antiterror Law's Time Limit on
Review, BosToN GLOBE, Nov. 29, 2002, at BI (noting that many judges are criticizing current
habeas legislation and further noting that Senator Edward Kennedy is in favor of reforms to
restore full habeas corpus rights to state prisoners).
73. Cf Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After
Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1982) (suggesting that federal courts consider
whether state courts systematically err in Fourth Amendment cases when deciding whether the
state courts have provided litigants with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth
Amendment claims).
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This Part begins by explaining why, at its inception, federal habeas review
of state court criminal convictions was concerned not just with correcting
violations of individual rights, but also with redressing systemic state practices.
After describing how this systemic aspect of the Great Writ has been lost, I will
explain why a systemic focus needs to be restored. Specifically, I will discuss
the many ways in which states currently violate defendants' rights
systematically. Finally, I will examine the leading proposals for habeas reform
and explain how they fail to redress these systemic problems.
A. A Lost Purpose
Conventional wisdom views habeas corpus as designed to guarantee
individual liberties, and in important ways it does.74 Originally, however, "the
writ arose from a theory of power rather than a theory of liberty."7 In England,
it was initially used as a device for compelling a person's appearance before the
King's judiciary,76 thus ensuring that local jailers respected the King's juris-
diction. 7 In this early form, the writ was more coercive than emancipatory.78
When Congress originally gave the federal courts jurisdiction over state
prisoners' claims, it crafted legislation that gave meaning to both the emanci-
patory and coercive aspects of the Great Writ. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
gave federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus in "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." 79 Before it was
through, the Reconstruction Congress also proposed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and created both federal question and federal removal jurisdiction.80
Through these measures, Congress gave the federal courts more power to
oversee state action. Although these jurisdictional statutes allowed federal
courts to hear individualized claims, they also empowered them to entertain
systemic challenges to state action in federal court. After all, the problem that
Congress faced was not just one of isolated violations of individual rights.
Rather, it was a problem of rogue states refusing to enforce new federal rights
74. See infra Section I.C; see also sources collected supra notes 17-20.
75. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REv. 575, 586 (2008).
76. See THOMAS, supra note 48, at 75.
77. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-45 (2008) ("[A]t the outset [habeas
corpus] was used to protect not the rights of citizens but those of the King and his courts....
[T]he writ. . . was in its earliest use a mechanism for securing compliance with the King's laws. .
. . [B]y issuing the writ of habeas corpus common-law courts sought to enforce the King's
prerogative to inquire into the authority of a jailer to hold a prisoner.").
78. See THOMAS, supra note 48, at 75; Bator, supra note 26.
79. HABEAS CoRPus AcT OF 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (2006)).
80. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006);
see also George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers'
Bill ofRights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 187 (2001).
2010] 13
HeinOnline  -- 98 Cal. L. Rev. 13 2010
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
systematically.8 1
For this reason, federal habeas review of state court criminal convictions
was not only about emancipating wrongly convicted individuals; it was also
about coercing reluctant states to enforce federal rights. As Senator Lyman
Trumbull explained, the habeas legislation was designed "to meet a class of
cases which was arising in the rebel States, where, under pretense of certain
State laws, men made free by the Constitution of the United States were
virtually being enslaved."82 Senator Trumbull emphasized the desire to address
a "class of cases" because the Habeas Corpus Act was designed, at least in part,
to address the problem of systemic state resistance.8 3
Until relatively recently, the idea that one writ could be used to redress a
problem affecting multiple state prisoners was a well-accepted part of habeas
practice. Habeas corpora existed in England,84 and early American statutory
enactments spoke of the Great Writ as having collective, as well as individual,
forms. More recently, federal courts in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s
permitted petitioners to file habeas class actions that were binding on entire
groups of prisoners. The Supreme Court effectively eliminated these class
81. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 426 (1961) ("In 1867, Congress was anticipating
Southern resistance to Reconstruction and to the implementation of the post-war constitutional
Amendments."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
748, 752 (1987) (describing Congressional concern about Southern state policies). The Committee
on Reconstruction issued an 800-page report early in 1866 detailing the many ways in which the
state of Kentucky was engaging in systemic civil rights violations-including continuing to keep
men, women, and children enslaved. See Clark D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad
Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1112 (1995) (citing and
discussing REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 39-30
(1866)). When Representative William Lawrence proposed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 in the
House, he specifically mentioned the need to give Judge Ballard, a federal judge known for
enforcing civil liberties, the power to enforce civil liberties in Kentucky. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
82. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868); see also id. at 2095, 2115, 2127,
2165.
83. See David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 739 ("[T]he
Reconstruction Congress ... authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of
state prisoners because of distrust of state criminal justice systems."); see also Am Woolhandler,
Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 604-11 (1993) (explaining that nineteenth century
constitutional litigation was focused on systemic rather than random individual illegality).
84. See Note, Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1491 n.64
(1968) [hereinafter Multiparty Habeas]. Courts often used one writ to establish jurisdiction over
many people. For example, one writ was used to summon all of the members of a jury. See
ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS
THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 15 & nn.38-40 (1960).
85. The Acts of Aug. 29, 1842 and March 2, 1833 both spoke in terms of "person or
persons" or "prisoner or prisoners" obtaining "his or their writ." See Multiparty Habeas, supra
note 84, at 1491 & n.63. This was changed from the plural to the singular, without comment,
when several habeas acts, some of which had been plural and some of which had been singular,
were consolidated for codification in 1873. See id. at 1491.
86. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 11.4(b) (5th ed. 2001) (collecting cases); Garrett, supra note 14, at 388 n.15 (noting
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actions in 1998 when it prohibited any advance ruling on common issues in
habeas class action petitions unless all of the class members had properly
presented their individual claims to the state courts.87 With the demise of the
federal habeas class action, little remains of the coercive, structural model of
federal habeas review. Vestiges of the structural aspect of the Great Writ,
however, can still be found in the exceptions to the procedural barriers to
federal habeas review.
Consider, for example, the procedural default doctrine and its exceptions.
Before the federal courts will procedurally default a habeas petitioner's claim
for failure to comply with a state procedural rule, the federal court will ask
whether the state rule is an adequate one-meaning, among other things, that it
is consistently applied in the state courts and does not unduly burden the
exercise of a federal constitutional right. Although federal courts can and do
find procedural rules inadequate because of the way that they affect an
individual case,89 federal courts also declare state procedural rules inadequate
when the rules reflect recurring state hostility to federal constitutional claims
across cases.90 Thus, adequacy review encourages federal courts, in some cases,
to focus on state practices that violate individual rights systematically.
Similarly, the federal courts will not procedurally default a habeas
petitioner's claim if the petitioner can show cause for failing to comply with the
state procedural rule and prejudice to the outcome. 91 State actions that hinder
compliance with a procedural rule or make compliance impracticable establish
cause to excuse a procedural default.92 Moreover, these state actions are often
part of a pattern or practice that gets repeated across many cases. As a result,
federal courts that refuse to honor state procedural defaults because the state
has hindered the habeas petitioner's ability to comply with the rule are often
addressing systemic state actions that have the effect of undermining
that for two decades federal courts certified habeas class actions). For a discussion of why habeas
class actions were not effective in remedying systemic state problems, see discussion infra Section
V.C.3
87. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998); see also Garrett, supra note 14, at 408
(discussing how the Supreme Court's ruling in Calderon led to the demise of habeas class
actions).
88. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984).
89. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).
90. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of The
Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 262-63 (2003) (collecting cases
that explain how the inconsistency branch of adequacy review typically results in facial
invalidation of the state procedural rule and is motivated by a concern that the state is
discriminating against the federal right); see also id. at 264-65 (collecting cases in which the
undue burden branch of adequacy review has invalidated a state procedural rule across cases); see
also Breechen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1364 (1994) (10th Cir. 1994) (declaring an Oklahoma
procedural rule inadequate because it requires defendants to raise trial attorney ineffectiveness
challenges on direct appeal while simultaneously not giving them an opportunity for additional
fact-finding at that stage).
91. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
92. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 86, § 26.3(b) (collecting cases).
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defendants' constitutional rights. Thus, even within the current individualized
form of federal habeas review, there are several small ways in which federal
courts address systemic state practices that violate defendants' constitutional
rights. However, these procedural exceptions do not do enough work in the
current habeas system to promote systemic reform in the states.93
This Article proposes a paradigm shift. Rather than relegate consideration
of structural concerns about systemic state practices to the exceptions to a
procedural default bar, we should recognize that systemic state practices that
violate defendants' rights are themselves a central problem that needs to be
redressed and restructure federal habeas review in ways that recover its
coercive, systemic aspects.
Admittedly, a nonindividualized form of federal habeas corpus review
may be controversial, but it is not foreign to our habeas system. On the
contrary, it is consistent with one of the original reasons for extending federal
habeas review to state criminal convictions and with historical applications of
the Great Writ.
B. The Ongoing Problem of Systemic Violations
The problem that convinced Reconstruction Republicans of the need for
federal judicial supervision of the states was, of course, a problem of
sectionalism. They feared that Southern states would systematically flout the
reconfigured Constitution. 94 In later generations, as the sectional divide became
less salient, scholars articulated other reasons why federal court review was
93. In theory, adequacy determinations and findings of cause to excuse procedural defaults
could put an end to many systemic state procedural violations by encouraging states to change
offensive procedural rules. In practice, however, this does not happen. As an initial matter, there is
the problem of time. The exhaustion and procedural default requirements entangle criminal
defendants in years of state court review before they are permitted to file federal habeas petitions.
See KING REPORT, supra note 6. Consequently, even if a federal judge ignores a state procedural
default and grants habeas relief, it often comes so long after the original state violation that there
is little deterrent effect on the offending state. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976)
(discussing the "dubious assumption" that law enforcement authorities are deterred from
committing Fourth Amendment violations out of fear that the conviction might be overturned in
collateral proceedings); Hammel, supra note 5, at 79 ("Even when post-conviction lawyers win
reversals of convictions, those reversals come so long after the original trial that any tendency
they might have to deter wrongdoing by state officials is attenuated.").
Next, there is a problem of scale. Federal grants of habeas relief are too rare to provide the
states with any incentive to change their offensive procedures. See supra notes 6-8 &
accompanying text. There is little threat that the state's criminal convictions will be disrupted if
the state does not change its ways. As a result, states often ignore federal habeas rulings that their
procedural rules are inadequate and continue to apply the offending rules. See, e.g., Richie v.
Sirmons, No. 98-CV-482, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41273 (N.D. Okla. May 21, 2008) (noting that
the state courts still improperly default ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims even after
federal courts have held that their defaults are inadequate); see also infra note 117 and
accompanying text (noting that, despite several federal findings that the state is misapplying its
contemporaneous objection rule, New York courts continue to engage in this practice).
94. See sources collected supra note 81.
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necessary to ensure state compliance with the Constitution. The mainstream
view today is that federal judges are more expert than their state counterparts,
more solicitous of constitutional rights, more insulated from political pressure,
and more able to apply uniform interpretations of federal law.95 A growing
number of scholars suggest, however, that the disparity between state and
federal courts is now more myth than reality and that state judges are equally
capable of enforcing federal constitutional rights.96 Some have accordingly
argued that habeas review is no longer needed "to force defiant state courts to
obey federal constitutional law."97
That view, however, underestimates the degree to which state courts still
routinely violate defendants' constitutional rights.98 Some of these violations
are clear on the face of state law.99 More of them are endemic in state practice.
Throughout Michigan, for example, state judges arraign defendants and ask
them to plead guilty to misdemeanor offenses that carry jail sentences without
ever informing them that they have a right to a lawyer.1oo It is so bad in one
county that the days on which the district court arraigns people-typically
without counsel present-are generally referred to as "McJustice Day[s]."101
In this subsection, I explain why there is a need for systemic habeas
reform by describing three categories of systemic errors that currently go
unchecked in state criminal justice systems: right-to-counsel violations, due
process violations, and prosecutorial misconduct.102 The categories are merely
95. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (2007) ("Only Article III judges, who unlike their state
counterparts are always politically independent and experts in federal law, can be trusted
ultimately to expound that law accurately and guarantee its supremacy and uniformity."); Martin
H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts:
Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1787 & n.104 (1992)
(noting that federal judges should shape and enforce federal law because of their "presumed
expertise ... in interpreting federal law" and "sensitivity to the importance of federal rights").
96. See, e.g., John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes ofFederal Question Jurisdiction, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 247 (2007); Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking
the Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 95 (2009).
97. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 795; see also id. at 796 (noting that the
"structural and systemic problems in state criminal justice that led to widespread deprivations of
federal rights . . . have largely dissipated.").
98. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 401-04; see also Yackle, supra note 1, at 556-57.
99. See, e.g., People v. Brendlin, 136 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Brendlin v.
California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007). In that case, the California court held that, as a matter of law,
car passengers have no standing to assert Fourth Amendment challenges when the vehicles in
which they are riding get pulled over, because the passengers are not seized as a constitutional
matter. 136 P.3d at 855. The United States Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the
California court had ignored the governing federal test for determining when a person is seized
under the Fourth Amendment and had introduced an element of subjectivity into the analysis that
had been rejected by the Supreme Court. 127 S. Ct. at 2408. Thus, California's legal interpretation
of the governing federal standard had improperly diluted defendants' Fourth Amendment rights.
100. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 10, at ii.
101. Id. atmiii.
102. Readers may not agree that all of the examples I provide involve violations of federal
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examples and are certainly not exhaustive. However, they do demonstrate the
extent and scope of the systemic problems in state criminal justice systems and
explain why restoring a coercive, structural model of federal habeas review is
important.
1. Right-to-Counsel Errors
Many states routinely underfund their public defender offices, thus
denying indigent defendants their constitutional right to effective trial
counsel.103 In Louisiana, for example, the primary means of funding indigent
defense is through traffic ticket revenue. 104 When Hurricane Katrina hit, the
police stopped writing traffic tickets, and New Orleans was forced to lay off
almost all of its public defenders.10 5 Many other states face similar budget
constraints that prohibit them from appointing adequate counsel for indigent
criminal defendants.' 06 As an obvious consequence, these states systematically
constitutional rights. Any right is subject to more and less expansive interpretations. These
examples are not exhaustive. They are merely intended to illustrate the existence of a problem.
The scope of the problem is something that the federal courts would address if federal habeas
review were reconfigured to focus on systemic challenges.
103. See supra note 10; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)
(describing the constitutional right to effective trial counsel).
104. See Georgia N. Vagenas, Review of National Indigent Defense Developments, 11
DIALOGUE 17 (2007).
105. See Louisiana Overhauls Public-Defender System (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 14,
2007), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=14412362.
106. Public Defenders in Minnesota, Kentucky, Florida, and Georgia are unable to handle
all of their cases due to budget constraints. See Scott Michels, Facing Budget "Crisis, " Public
Defenders May Refuse Cases, ABC NEWS, June 13, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/
print?id=5049461. Georgia recently cut the hourly rate that it pays appointed counsel in capital
cases, fired forty-one employees, and dismantled a number of offices. See Vagenas, supra note
104, at 19. Virginia places a $120 cap on the fee that it will pay to an attorney who handles a
juvenile delinquency case, regardless of the severity of the charges. See id. at 17. As of 2007,
attorneys can apply for a fee waiver to get additional money, but the fee waiver program has not
been adequately funded. See VIRGINIA FAIR TRIAL PROJECT, PROGRESS REPORT: VIRGINIA'S
PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM (2007).
In other states, public defenders are routinely forced to handle more than a thousand criminal
cases a year - almost three times the number that the American Bar Association has concluded
one attorney can handle effectively. See, e.g., BRUCE A. MYERS, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS,
DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: OFFICE OF
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 15 (2001), available at
http://www.ola.state.md.us/Reports/Performance/PubDefen.pdf (noting that public defenders in
Baltimore were handling 1,163 cases per year); Vagenas, supra note 104, at 19 (emphasizing that,
in 2006, the Knox County Public Defender Office in Tennessee was appointed nearly 21,000
cases which were handled by only 23 attorneys); see also State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 789 (La.
1993) (describing a Louisiana public defender with more than 700 open cases and noting that
"[n]ot even a lawyer with an 'S' on his chest could effectively handle th[at] docket"); Eve
Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686-87 (2007) (collecting caseload statistics for
different jurisdictions); ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet .pdf
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fail to provide effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth
Amendment.
Many states also have procedural rules that systematically prevent
defendants from asserting right-to-counsel claims. In Oklahoma, for example, a
defendant who wants to challenge the effectiveness of his trial attorney must
raise that claim on direct appeal. o7 If additional facts are needed to support the
claim, the defendant must file a motion to remand the case to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing during which he can supplement the record with
evidence of his trial attorney's incompetence.108 If a defendant fails to raise an
ineffectiveness challenge on direct appeal, the claim is waived and cannot be
raised in state postconviction proceedings. 109 However, Oklahoma does not
require separate, new counsel on appeal, 0 thus leaving many defense attorneys
in the untenable position of having to raise their own ineffectiveness on
appeal. 111 Even defendants who have new counsel often cannot raise trial attor-
ney ineffectiveness claims on appeal, because the Oklahoma courts deny
virtually all motions to remand cases for evidentiary development of
ineffectiveness claims.112 There is clear evidence that Oklahoma routinely
provides ineffective trial counsel to indigent defendants," so this pattern
cannot simply reflect the absence of meritorious claims. Given that ineffective
(noting the figures of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals, Task Force on Courts, which provide for a maximum caseload per year of 150 felonies,
400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals).
107. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, ch. 18, App. R. 3.11 (2003).
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999).
110. See, e.g., McCracken v. State, 946 P.2d 672, 676 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (defaulting
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise it on direct appeal even
though appellate attorney was the same as trial attorney); Neill v. State, 943 P.2d 145, 148 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1997) (same).
111. See McCracken, 946 P.2d at 676; Neill, 943 P.2d at 148. Sometimes, there can be
systemic problems even when the trial and appellate counsel are different. See, e.g., Cannon v.
Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the Oklahoma appellate
defenders have a policy of not raising ineffectiveness challenges on direct appeal when the trial
attorney was a public defender).
112. See English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that, in a
seventeen-month time period, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed no fewer than
twenty-four postconviction capital cases raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and
that not one remand was granted in those cases).
113. Oklahoma provides trial counsel to indigent defendants in three different ways: (1)
through public defender offices; (2) through contracts under which private defense attorneys agree
to be paid a flat fee to handle any and all indigent defendants who pass through the system; or (3)
by paying private counsel an hourly rate (with fee caps) to take on the cases. OKLAHOMA
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2007), available at
http://www.ok.gov/OIDS/documents/2007%2OAnnual%20Report.pdf For a discussion of why all
three of these systems create structural trial attorney ineffectiveness problems, see generally
Primus, supra note 106, at 686-88. For a discussion of the ways in which Oklahoma specifically
is underprotecting the right to counsel, see Oklahoma Indigent Defense System's Struggles
Continue, 2 THE SPANGENBURG REPORT, 1996, at 11-12, available at http://www.spangenberg
group.com/newsletter/TSG-vol2_issue4.pdf.
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assistance of counsel claims are typically about what attorneys failed to do, the
courts' refusal to permit expansion of the trial record is devastating. The result
is a statewide system in which defendants are denied their constitutional right
to effective trial counsel and are prevented from challenging that denial in the
state courts.' 14
2. Due Process Violations
Many states systematically violate federal due process rights by erecting
procedural barriers that prevent defendants from exercising or vindicating other
federal constitutional rights. The Oklahoma remand procedure just described is
one example. Consider also the following practice, familiar in several states: A
criminal defendant attempts to raise a claim on direct appeal and is told by the
appellate courts that the claim can or should be raised during state
postconviction review. However, when the defendant then attempts to raise the
claim on state postconviction review, the postconviction court holds that the
claim is procedurally defaulted for failure to comply with a state procedural
rule requiring him to raise it on direct appeal.' 15 Such a bait-and-switch effec-
tively prevents defendants from ever having their federal claims considered.
In New York, state appellate courts systematically violate defendants' due
process rights by routinely misapplying the state's contemporaneous objection
rule in ways that prevent criminal defendants from vindicating their constitu-
tional claims. Specifically, the appellate courts default federal claims for failure
to comply with the rule even when the record demonstrates that the defendants
114. Oklahoma is not the only jurisdiction to have a procedural regime that, in practice,
systematically denies defendants an opportunity to raise trial attorney ineffectiveness claims. See,
e.g., Hoffmann v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Idaho statute requiring
capital defendants to file any legal or factual challenges to their sentences or convictions within
forty-two days of the judgment effectively prevents them from raising ineffectiveness challenges
because forty-two days is not long enough to do any investigation or even get the trial transcripts).
In New York, on-the-record ineffectiveness claims must be raised on direct appeal, but
ineffectiveness claims that rely on evidence outside of the trial record may be raised during state
postconviction proceedings. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 440.10(2)(c) (McKinney 2005). The New York
courts, however, routinely bar ineffectiveness challenges raised during postconviction proceedings
on the ground that they are on-the-record claims that should have been raised on direct appeal,
even when they require factual development outside the record. See Ramsey v. Bennett, No. 02-
CV-5290, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45483, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2007); Powers v. Lord, 462
F. Supp. 2d 371, 378-79 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Etoria v. Bennett, 292 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (E.D.N.Y.
2003); see also Bradley v. Clark, No. 99 C 1785, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18490, at *7-16 (N.D.
Ill. July 22, 2002) (finding a similar state problem in Illinois). And in Michigan, state procedural
rules effectively prevent defendants from raising ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bock, No. 01-10252-BC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4020, at *20-25 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 2, 2006) (ruling that the state courts' interpretation of the Michigan rules to default
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims for failure to raise them on direct appeal was
nonsensical because it required appellate counsel to raise his own effectiveness).
115. See Wilson v. Ozmint, 357 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 114
(collecting New York cases).
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made timely objections.116 Despite several federal findings that the state
contemporaneous objection rule, as applied, unduly burdens defendants' consti-
tutional rights, New York courts continue to engage in this practice.117
To make matters worse, the very structure of the New York criminal
justice system leaves many systemic violations of constitutional rights un-
checked. Over three-quarters of New York's trial courts are "Justice Courts."' 18
These courts handle roughly two million cases each year, including mis-
demeanor and lesser criminal cases, as well as arraignments for the most
serious felonies. 1 9 But there is no statute requiring verbatim recordkeeping of
any Justice Court proceeding,120 and many Justice Courts have no official
recording system. Typically, the local justice, who is often not even a lawyer,
just takes handwritten notes on the proceedings.121 If the case is appealed, there
is no adequate record on appeal and thus no way to ensure that Justice Courts
adequately enforce litigants' constitutional rights.122
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In Brady v. Maryland,123 the Supreme Court ruled that criminal
defendants have a due process right to exculpatory information and imposed an
116. See, e.g., Garcia v. Portuondo, 104 Fed. Appx. 776, 780 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Garcia
clearly objected on Batson grounds and did so in a manner that unmistakably made his position
known to the court.") (internal quotations and ellipses omitted); Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217,
246 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Cotto's compliance with New York's preservation rule here was arguably
literal, and not just substantial."); Daley v. Artus, No. 03-CV-4109, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23428,
at *26-27 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2003) ("Daley objected repeatedly at trial to specific questions ...
by the prosecutor, and at specific points in the prosecutor's summation. . . . Indeed, . . . the
objections could not have been more 'contemporaneous.' . . . I question what else Daley could
have done to make his position clear to the trial court."); see also Silverman v. Edwards, 69 Fed.
Appx. 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); Sanford v. Burge, 334 F. Supp. 2d 289 299-300 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (same). New York is not the only state that misapplies its preservation rules in order to
default federal claims. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hardaway v. Young, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012
(N.D. Ill. 2005), rev'don other grounds, 302 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2002).
117. See, e.g., Ojar v. Greene, No. 05-CV-3674, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11744, at *24-26
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008); Fong v. Poole, 552 F. Supp. 2d 642, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Weathers v.
Conway, No. 05-CV-139S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59911, at *19-20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007);
Garvey v. Duncan, No. 02 Civ. 4208, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17499, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,
2005).
118. JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPMAN, ACTION PLAN FOR THE JUSTICE COURTS,
preface (2006) [hereinafter "ACTION PLAN"], available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
publications/pdfs/ActionPlan-JusticeCourts.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id. (noting that 72 percent of New York's nearly 2,000 town and village justices are
nonlawyers).
122. Id. ("In part because particular record reconstructions have been found to be
insufficient on which to conduct appellate review of Justice Court proceedings, the lack of
verbatim Justice Court records has raised serious concerns about Justice Court enforcement of
litigant rights and compliance with other constitutional, statutory and regulatory directives.")
(footnote omitted).
123. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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affirmative duty on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory information to
defendants before trial. The Court extended this duty to disclose information to
impeachment evidence in Giglio v. United States. 124 Unfortunately, prosecutors
frequently violate the directives of Brady and Giglio,125 and when they do, their
misconduct is often not discovered until well into state postconviction
review -26 a process that occurs months or even years after trial and
sentencing.127 By that time, state statutes of limitations often prevent defend-
ants from raising Brady or Giglio claims. For example, under Idaho law even
capital defendants have only six weeks after sentencing to discover and argue
that the state withheld critical impeachment evidence about prosecution
witnesses.128 Given that many Giglio violations are not discovered until long
after trial,129 the Idaho statute of limitations effectively denies most capital
defendants their due process right to impeachment evidence.
Similarly, many states statutorily require that defendants demonstrate their
factual innocence in order to obtain review of Brady claims that are not discov-
ered within a prescribed time period. 130 The Supreme Court has never limited
Brady due process rights to those who are factually innocent. On the contrary,
124. 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
125. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 14, at 401-03 (noting that suppression of evidence in
violation of Brady is a frequent cause of capital reversals); see also id. at 423 (describing the
repeated misconduct of Oklahoma County District Attorney Robert H. Macy).
126. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 909 (1995); Richard
A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. REV. 693, 702-03 (1987).
127. See, e.g., Thirty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 35 GEo. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 1, 360 n.1210 (2006) (collecting cases involving delays ranging from two to thirteen
years).
128. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(5)(b) (2008) (requiring any challenge to a capital
conviction or sentence to be brought within forty-two days of the imposition of the capital
sentence and not permitting a successive petition for any claim that "alleges matters that are ...
impeaching . . ."); Row v. State, 21 P.3d 895, 899 (2001) (refusing to allow a Brady claim to
move forward because, among other things, the evidence would be "merely impeaching").
Alabama has a similar rule with a one-year limitations period. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c)
(imposing a one-year statute of limitations for all postconviction petitions); Barbour v. State, 903
So. 2d 858, 868 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that Brady claims are subject to procedural default
under Alabama Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(c) unless they can qualify as "newly discovered"
evidence under Rule 32.1(e)); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e) (excluding newly discovered
impeachment evidence from the purview of the rule). As these rules demonstrate, Giglio
impeachment material that is discovered more than one year after conviction is statutorily barred
from consideration by any Alabama court. See Johnson v. State, No. CR-05-1805, 2007 Ala.
Crim. App. LEXIS 178 at *23 (Sept. 28, 2007) ("It is well-settled that newly discovered evidence
under [Rule 32.1(e)] allows relief on Brady claims only where '[t]he facts do not merely amount
to impeachment evidence."').
129. See sources collected supra note 126.
130. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e). In Alabama, only defendants who can demonstrate their
innocence are entitled to raise delayed Brady claims in the state courts, even though Brady itself
clearly extends the right to exculpatory information to the guilty and innocent alike. Id. This is
true even if the defendant's delayed discovery of the claim is attributable to the State.
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it has expressly stated that a showing of materiality does not require any
demonstration that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted
in the defendant's acquittal. Rather, evidence is material if there is a
reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.132 Thus, by requiring a showing of factual
innocence before they are willing to entertain Brady claims, these states nullify
the rights of the many defendants who discover prosecutorial misconduct after
the statute of limitations expires.
C. The Shortcomings ofProposed Reforms
Many judges and scholars recognize that the current habeas system needs
to be reformed,133 but most of the proposed reforms would fail to cure the
problem of systemic violations. Some scholars have argued for a return to the
Warren Court orientation under which federal courts were far more open to
reviewing state criminal convictions. Proposed by Gary Peller and Justice
William Brennan,1 34 the Full Relitigation/Federal Forum Model would allow
for full relitigation on habeas of all federal constitutional claims in federal
court.'35 Clearly, such an approach would allow federal courts to consider
claims of systemic state violations of constitutional rights, but it would not
prompt the courts to focus on systemic problems. Rather, it would inundate the
federal courts with petitions alleging individual as well as systemic errors.
Because federal judges are generally reluctant to make rulings that call
into question larger numbers of cases, and given the need to perform some
form of triage on the flood of petitions that would result from full
relitigation,137 a system allowing federal judges to address individual or
systemic claims on habeas review would often result in consideration of
individual claims to the exclusion of systemic ones. And although the federal
courts' willingness to step in and fix constitutional violations in individual
cases could send a message back to the offending states to modify their
systemic practices, it also could encourage elected state judges to avoid
131. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
132. See id.; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).
133. See sources collected supra notes 1-5.
134. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-22, 426-31 (1963); Peller, supra note 22.
135. See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional
Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 319-21; Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
991, 992 (1985).
136. See Anthony Amsterdam, Foreword to 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1998) ("Unless [a federal] judge is
satisfied that s/he can give relief in this case with no (or very little) prospect that other accused or
convicted persons will escape punishment, the judge will simply not [grant relief].").
137. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)
("He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is
not worth the search").
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political pressure by denying constitutional challenges with full knowledge that
the federal courts will right the wrong later.' 38
More fundamentally, the pressure to reduce the volume of habeas
petitions has taken a full relitigation approach off the table as a practical matter.
Even Larry Yackle, one of the most vociferous advocates of a federal forum for
consideration of federal rights, has been forced to admit that full relitigation is
no longer politically feasible.'3 9 Liberals and conservatives alike recognize that,
in a world of limited time and resources, any proposed reform must streamline
federal habeas review in some way in order to be viable.140 Unfortunately, most
proposals streamline federal habeas review in ways that would prevent the
federal courts from addressing entire categories of systemic state violations.
Paul Bator's Process Model, for example, would give federal habeas
courts the power to consider state criminal cases only if (1) the state prisoner
was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claims
in state court, or (2) the state court did not have jurisdiction over his case.141
Although federal courts operating under this model might address some
systemic procedural violations, they would not be allowed to address any
systemic substantive violations. In fact, Professor Bator explicitly states that
federal habeas courts should not "question whether substantive error[s] of...
law occurred" in the state courts. 142 Thus, state court judges could repeatedly
ignore entire swaths of federal law when deciding constitutional questions, and
their decisions would be insulated from federal review.143 Much the same is
true of Judge Henry Friendly's Innocence Model of federal habeas review,
138. See Semeraro, supra note 70, at 1248 ("Elected state judges may be more likely to
deny constitutional challenges if they know that life-tenured federal judges are waiting to clean up
the mess.").
139. See Yackle, supra note 1, at 553.
140. See, e.g., Hammel, supra note 5, at 42 ("[a]ny reform, if it is to have a chance of
success, must address the felt need to make habeas procedures more streamlined and efficient.").
141. See Bator, supra note 26.
142. Id. at 455.
143. See Semeraro, supra note 27, at 927 ("[P]rocess review ... does no good if the state
decision-maker ignores federal law."). Professor Semeraro argues for a Reasoning-Process
Review Model of federal habeas corpus review under which the federal court would consider
whether the state court cited the relevant federal law and weighed the appropriate factors when
relying on that law to decide a federal constitutional issue. See id. at 927-28. If the state court
relied on the correct law and weighed the appropriate factors, the federal court would let the
decision stand. If it did not, the federal court would send it back to the state court for a more
thorough analysis. See id. Unfortunately, this model, like the Process Model, fails to check
substantive systemic violations of criminal procedure rights. A state court that correctly cites the
relevant federal law but assigns different weight to the various factors or balances them differently
would be insulated from federal review. Thus, a state court could dilute federal constitutional
standards as long as it cited the right law and relied on the right factors when doing so.
Another variant of the Process Model was offered by Andrew Hammel. See Hammel, supra
note 5, at 67. His Coercive Quid-Pro-Quo Model would allow the state to obtain expedited,
deferential federal habeas corpus review of a state criminal conviction as long as it could show
that there was a full and adequate hearing in state court. Like other process approaches, the
Coercive-Quid-Pro-Quo Model ignores substantive systemic state violations.
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which is essentially the process model plus an authorization for federal courts
to review those cases in which the habeas petitioners can make a colorable
showing of innocence. 14 4 This approach would ignore systemic substantive
violations in all cases involving defendants who are unable to make such a
showing.145
Some scholars and judges have advocated a claims-based approach to
federal habeas review in which some constitutional rights are cognizable on
federal habeas while others are not.146 To some extent, the Supreme Court
endorsed this view in Stone v. Powell,147 when it removed most Fourth
Amendment claims from federal habeas review. In the interest of streamlining
habeas review by creating a hierarchy of federal rights, the claims-based model
straightforwardly ignores systemic violations of disfavored federal
constitutional rights that are not cognizable on habeas. Although such an
approach might deter states from violating favored rights, its complete neglect
of other rights might lead to more unconstitutional behavior overall. 148
Most recently, Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King have proposed
eliminating federal habeas review entirely for most state prisoners1 49 and
reallocating the resources currently spent on federal habeas review to improve
the quality of defense representation throughout the country.150 Like the claims-
based approach, this proposal favors one constitutional right-the right to
counsel-over all others. Because counsel is the means through which other
constitutional rights are raised, providing better counsel is likely to result in
more constitutional challenges based on other violations of defendants' rights.
However, the system proposed by Professors Hoffmann and King does not
provide any mechanism for checking other systemic state violations of defend-
ants' rights and does not ensure that systemic right-to-counsel violations will
144. See Friendly, supra note 24; see also Jeffries and Stuntz, supra note 25, at 691-92
(contending that, if such a showing is made, procedural barriers to review should be swept aside
so that a possibly innocent person can obtain federal review but that, absent such a showing, there
is no reason to excuse a default).
145. One might contend that, for every systemic substantive state violation of a
constitutional right, there will be an innocent defendant whose rights are violated. That innocent
defendant would then have standing to object on habeas under the Innocence Model. Thus, the
federal courts will eventually address all systemic substantive violations through innocence cases.
Such an argument, however, assumes that there will be enough innocent people convicted of
crimes to ensure the presentation of all types of substantive violations. Moreover, the Innocence
Model, like the Full Relitigation Model, does not force the federal courts to focus on systemic
state errors and is subject to the same criticisms for that reason. See discussion supra Section II.C.
146. See, e.g., Hoffstadt, supra note 28.
147. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
148. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 50, at 4.
149. They exempt from their proposal those who have never been convicted, those who
claim they are in custody in violation of a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, those who claim they are innocent, and those
sentenced to death who want to challenge either the constitutionality of the death sentence or their
eligibility to receive a death sentence. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 819-21.
150. See id. at 797; see also Liebman, supra note 33.
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not persist.
Although I agree with Professors Hoffmann and King that it is time to
rethink the federal role in state criminal justice and that a reallocation of
currently wasted resources is in order,s15 I am not as pessimistic as they are
about the role that federal habeas review can serve in checking systemic state
practices. Professors Hoffmann and King are right that, in its current form,
federal habeas review does not provide a remedy for the vast majority of state
criminal defendants and does not deter state violations of constitutional
criminal procedure rights.' 52 However, the fatal flaw underlying the current
habeas corpus system, and many of the proposals for reform, is that they
assume that habeas should deal with individual error correction and ask which
errors are worth correcting-process errors, guilt-innocence errors, or favored-
rights errors. By focusing on the aggrieved individual rather than the state,
these habeas theories do not stop state actors from violating constitutional
rights.'53 Only by shifting their focus to consider whether the state is creating
systemic problems will the federal courts be able to check systemic state errors.
III
A MODEL FOR SYSTEMIC HABEAS REVIEW
This Part proposes a modified habeas system under which federal habeas
review would focus on systemic state violations of constitutional rights. To be
clear, I do not object in principle to federal courts' reviewing state criminal
convictions to correct individual errors. As mentioned earlier, it would be
advisable to preserve individualized federal postconviction review in capital
cases, given the small number of capital cases and the severity of the
punishment involved. In a world of unlimited resources, one could imagine an
expanded error correction system for all cases, not just those involving capital
punishment, existing alongside a habeas system focused on systemic errors.154
151. See Hoffman & King, supra note 1, at 793.
152. See id. at 806, 810-15.
153. At least one other scholar has argued for a deterrence-related theory of federal habeas
review. See Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 151
(1994). However, the systemic habeas system proposed in this Article is more likely to deter state
courts from violating defendants' rights than the individual-deterrence proposal advocated by
Professor Lee. Professor Lee would have federal habeas courts grant relief whenever the
likelihood of deterring future state court constitutional violations outweighs the institutional and
social costs of granting relief. See id. at 198. He argues for a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis in
which the federal court asks, in each case, whether the deterrent function of granting relief is
outweighed by the costs. See id. Such a proposal, however, stacks the deck in favor of the costs
because the costs are aggregated and the benefits are localized. I would consider deterrence at a
metalevel and find that, whenever the error is systemic, it needs to be deterred such that habeas
relief should be granted.
154. At times, there have been proposals to expand the federal courts' direct appellate
review by having federal courts of appeal review cases immediately after relief is denied by the
highest state court as a way of supplementing the United States Supreme Court's direct review
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 135, at 320-21; Daniel J. Meador, Straightening Out
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Given a world of limited resources, however, we must slice the habeas pie
somehow. For the reasons described above, I propose slicing based on the
prevalence of the constitutional violation at issue.
The proposed reform would require statutory modification addressing
(1) standing to allege systemic violations; (2) procedural barriers to review;
(3) burdens of proof, discovery, and evidentiary hearings; (4) remedies; and
(5) legal assistance for petitioners. This Part describes the proposed model of
systemic review by addressing those five subjects in turn and concludes with a
discussion of potential Suspension Clause implications. Then, in Part IV, I
explain why this approach would be more effective than the current habeas sys-
tem at redressing systemic state violations, and, in Part V, I explain why this
approach is better than other potential approaches to structural reform, includ-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal enforcement actions, and habeas class actions.
A. Standing
Any model of federal habeas review designed to address systemic state
violations should focus on the state's systemic practices rather than on the
circumstances of an individual petitioner's case. That said, the petitioner who is
the vehicle for a systemic challenge must have a stake in the outcome, and his
case must be representative of the systemic problem, so that the issue is well
presented for federal consideration. To have standing to assert a systemic
challenge, therefore, a petitioner would have to prove that his federal rights
were violated in a way that was prejudicial to his own case.155 If the state
prejudicially violated the petitioner's federal rights, then the federal district
court would proceed to consider whether the violation was systemic. If the state
did not violate the petitioner's rights or if the error was harmless, the district
court would deny the petition without ever reaching the systemic challenge.
B. Procedural Barriers to Review
Several procedural barriers to review that mark the present habeas system
would make equally good sense in a system that was reconfigured to focus on
systemic violations. The statute of limitations,' 5 6 successive petition ban, 57
Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273 (1983). Alternatively, it would be
possible to have two different habeas tracks-one for individual errors and another for systemic
ones.
155. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that, in order to satisfy Article III's standing
requirements, a federal litigant must show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant and is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision). A habeas
petitioner under the proposed systemic regime would satisfy these Article III requirements. The
petitioner would have to show that that the right at issue in the systemic challenge was actually
violated in his case such that he was injured; that the violation is fairly traceable to the state and
thus caused by the state; and that the error was not harmless such that granting habeas relief would
actually redress the problem in his case.
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006).
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retroactivity bar, and procedural default doctrine' 59 have underlying
rationales that apply equally to habeas petitions focused on individual and
systemic claims.160
The exhaustion requirement, however, would not be necessary in a
systemic habeas model and should be eliminated. Under the current exhaustion
doctrine, habeas petitioners are not required to exhaust state remedies if there is
no available state corrective process or if the state process is ineffective at
protecting their rights.' 61 Systemic state violations are, by definition, circum-
stances under which the state process is ineffective. If a state judge or
prosecutor makes an individual mistake, perhaps the state's system will correct
it. But a systemic error is one that the state system countenances as a matter of
routine. Accordingly, it would be futile for litigants to present their claims of
systemic violations to the states, and litigants should not be required to exhaust
state remedies before presenting systemic challenges on federal habeas.162
Eliminating the delay caused by the exhaustion requirement would yield
many benefits. Perhaps most importantly for the project of correcting systemic
misbehavior, permitting petitioners to commence their habeas actions with less
157. See id. § 2244(b).
158. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1989).
159. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). Given that there would be no
exhaustion requirement in the proposed systemic habeas review system, see infra Section III.B.,
the number of systemic challenges that would be raised in state courts is likely to be small and, as
a result, the impact of the procedural default doctrine would be reduced substantially. After all, if
a habeas petitioner does not raise a systemic claim in state court, he will not have defaulted by
virtue of the way in which the claim was raised. Moreover, as is true in cases of individualized
habeas review, the federal court would always be able to entertain challenges to the adequacy of
state procedural rules. Because the adequacy of a state procedural rule is a federal question that
need not be initially raised in the state courts, see Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002), a
petitioner's failure to comply with a procedural rule that he alleges creates a systemic procedural
due process problem in the state should not bar federal review.
160. See infra Sections III.D & IV.B (discussing the application of the successive petition
ban and retroactivity bar to the current proposal). I do not mean to suggest that I agree with the
ways in which these procedural doctrines are currently configured; the point is merely that the
applicability of these doctrines does not turn on the difference between individual and systemic
claims.
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2006).
162. Some might contend that, because an individual petitioner's standing to assert a
systemic challenge requires a showing of an individualized, prejudicial harm in his case, there
should be an exhaustion requirement vis-A-vis that inquiry. The rationale behind the exhaustion
doctrine, however, does not support such a requirement. Exhaustion is designed to prevent
unnecessary disruption in state judicial proceedings by encouraging federal courts to wait to
interfere until the state courts have had an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation. See
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). When the question is whether the state is systematically
violating defendants' constitutional rights, however, the very nature of the claim means that the
state courts have had numerous opportunities to correct the error and have failed to do so. The
individual petitioner is merely a vehicle through which to raise the claim. Moreover, the federal
court does not disrupt state proceedings or provide any relief to the petitioner on the basis of the
violation of his individual rights; that showing of a violation merely satisfies a threshold standing
requirement. Therefore, an exhaustion requirement would merely tie up the federal courts in a
complicated procedural inquiry that would delay consideration of the merits.
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delay would improve the feedback mechanism to the offending states, thus
increasing the deterrent value of the federal decisions. If a federal court grants
habeas relief years after a state error, the case may have been forgotten, or the
personnel involved may have changed, and thus the federal decision would
effectively have no deterrent or reform value. Moreover, reducing delay would
make it easier for federal judges to grant relief in deserving cases without fear
that states would be unable to retry the petitioners. Finally, shortening the
timeline would bring habeas within the reach of large numbers of convicted
defendants for whom the custody requirement now prevents the seeking of
habeas relief at all.'6 A habeas corpus petition is, by definition, only available
to persons who are currently being held in violation of federal law. Most people
who are convicted of state crimes complete their sentences, and are thus no
longer in state custody, before they exhaust all possible avenues of relief in the
state courts. The exhaustion requirement therefore ensures that relatively few
defendants have the opportunity to file habeas petitions. 65 Eliminating the
exhaustion requirement would enable many more defendants to seek habeas
relief.166
C. Evidence, Discovery, and Burdens of-Proof
Once a habeas petitioner demonstrates that the state prejudicially violated
his federal rights, he would have the burden of producing evidence of a
systemic state problem. To satisfy this initial burden, the petitioner would have
to come forward with some evidence that the error in his case was part of a
pattern of errors and not simply an individual mistake. 167 The habeas court
would ask whether, taking all of the petitioner's statements as true and drawing
all inferences in his favor, there was some evidence of a systemic state
problem. This initial burden should not be high, because much of the data about
the state's practices in other cases is in the hands of the state rather than the
petitioner.
163. See THOMAS, supra note 48, at 165 (discussing that fear).
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (requiring custody); Hoffmann & King, supra note 1,
at 796 (noting that few defendants can satisfy the custody requirement).
165. See id.at 810.
166. Allowing more defendants to file habeas petitions may lead to an increase in the
number of filings. However, because the focus of the federal bench will be on whether the
problem asserted is systemic in nature, many more cases will be resolved with each federal ruling.
See discussion infra Section III.D. (discussing retroactivity principles that limit the scope of each
ruling and explaining the successive petition ban).
167. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (requiring the federal court to grant a defendant's request
for a hearing on a postconviction motion "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief"); Primus, supra note 106, at 708-09
(arguing that appellants should be granted hearings on their ineffective assistance challenges if
their pleadings state a colorable claim of ineffectiveness).
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Although there is no magic number of times that a state would have to err
in order to establish a systemic problem,' 68 a few things are clear. For one, the
first habeas petitioner to suffer from a given error could never demonstrate a
systemic problem, so he could not have a cognizable claim. Similarly, claims
that state judges unreasonably determined the facts in particular cases, or that
the evidence in a particular case was not sufficient to support a conviction,
would generally not be cognizable, because such errors tend to be individual
rather than systemic.1 69 Defendants who are victims of these individualized
errors would have to resort to other causes of action to obtain relief.170
In some cases, demonstrating a systemic problem will be easy, because
the systemic nature of some errors is clear on the face of trial and appellate
records. 7 1 Errors in interpreting federal law often fall into this category. When
a repeat-player state judge relying on an erroneous interpretation of federal law
violates a given constitutional right in multiple criminal cases, the existence of
a systemic problem is easily detected in the transcripts or opinions. In such
cases, the petitioner can satisfy his burden by citing cases in which the state
judge consistently misapplied the law. Similarly, procedures that deny criminal
defendants' due process rights are often readily visible in state statutes or rules.
Unearthing systemic violations that are not clear on the face of state law is
more difficult and requires greater knowledge of how the local criminal justice
system operates. In such cases, petitioners would often have to carry their
initial burden of production with affidavits from other defendants, defense
attorneys, or prosecutors. Take, for example, the Oklahoma remand procedure
for establishing ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.172 One way a
habeas petitioner could attack that procedure as a systemic violation of the right
to counsel would be to attach an affidavit from a state defense attorney
explaining that the attorney had attempted to obtain numerous remands in order
to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims, that there was reason to
believe that the claims were meritorious, and that the appellate courts never
agreed to remand a single case. Alternatively, a habeas petitioner could submit
affidavits from numerous defendants who sought remand, detailing their
attempts, the uniform denials, and the facts in the underlying cases
demonstrating that they were entitled to hearings.
Once a petitioner offered some evidence of a systemic problem, the
federal district court would conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether
168. Cf Batson v. Kennedy, 476 U.S. 79 (1985) (noting that the number of strikes that will
lead to an inference of discrimination is going to depend on the available jury pool).
169. To the extent that a state routinely declares a type of evidence insufficient to support a
verdict, it could pose a systemic problem.
170. See infra note 181 & accompanying text.
171. See Halpern, supra note 73, at 33 (noting that federal judges can often detect the
systemic nature of an error on the face of the pleadings and state court opinions rendered in a
case).
172. See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
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there was a systemic state problem. The petitioner would be entitled to
discovery prior to that hearing. 173 At the hearing itself, the state would have the
burden of persuading the court that it adequately enforces the right at issue.
After all, the state is better situated to explain its actions across cases, because
it has greater access to information and evidence about its practices than the
individual habeas petitioner does. If a petitioner establishes that his rights were
violated and provides some evidence of a recurring state violation, it therefore
makes sense to shift the burden to the state to refute the charge of a systemic
problem.
Admittedly, discovery and evidentiary hearings are costly procedures that
tax both the state charged with defending its practices and the federal judges
charged with presiding over the proceedings. That said, states and federal
courts already invest significant resources in habeas cases. However, the money
is currently wasted either on the procedural morass of habeas jurisprudence or
on redundant and deferential merits review. This Article's proposal would
entail some expense, but it would also save a great deal elsewhere: what is now
wasted could be reallocated to more fruitful uses.174
D. Remedies
If the federal judge finds that an individual petitioner's rights were
prejudicially violated but that the violation was not a systemic one, she should
deny habeas relief. Of course, the petitioner would have an opportunity to try to
appeal the decision.175 But once the decision was final, the ban on successive
petitions would prohibit other similarly situated petitioners from raising the
same systemic challenge,' 76 assuming no change in circumstances in the
state177 and adequate representation of the petitioners' interests by effective
173. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 100 (discussing the advantages of discovery in § 1983
cases and noting that federal discovery may go a long way toward uncovering and providing the
remedy for patterns of error in our criminal justice system).
174. Moreover, some of the costs that states would bear when the new model of habeas was
first introduced would decrease over time as technology is integrated into state courts. Admittedly,
Oklahoma might now have difficulty determining how many times its judges have granted
hearings in response to motions for remand alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. However,
answering such questions should become easier as electronic filing becomes more routine. And it
is already clear from other contexts that requiring state agencies to collect and maintain records of
their practices is both feasible and valuable in monitoring future compliance with federal law. See
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1387, 1411-12, 1418-19 (2007) (discussing the value of data collection in the context of federal
enforcement actions under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006)); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the
Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BuFF. CluM. L. REV. 815, 839-41 (1999)
(same); see also id. at 854-55 (noting that whatever civil liberties costs are attendant upon the
maintenance of such records will presumably be more than offset by the records' value).
175. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2006).
176. Cf Multiparty Habeas, supra note 84 (noting that, if a constitutional claim is raised in
the case of one individual and is denied, the question is settled).
177. Obviously, when the state revises or changes its procedures, a habeas petition that
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counsel in the first case.
At first blush, it might seem awkward for a federal court to find that a
habeas petitioner's constitutional rights were prejudicially violated but still
deny relief because the violation was not systemic. The federal judge would, in
effect, be ruling that the petitioner has a right without a remedy, and that is a
dissatisfying conclusion. But a moment's reflection is all that is needed to see
how common a conclusion it is within the practice of the federal courts. Federal
judges routinely find rights with no remedies in cases involving qualified
immunity, for example. 179 Under the current habeas system, most petitioners
whose rights are violated effectively have no remedies, due to the battery of
procedural obstacles to relief as well as the deferential standard of federal
habeas review. 80 Clearly, then, the fact that judges would often deny relief
even after finding individual violations of constitutional rights cannot be a
decisive objection to a systemic habeas approach. 81
On the other hand, a federal judge who concluded that a state was system-
atically violating a constitutional right would have to craft an appropriate
remedial order. Specifically, she would impose a variant of conditional release,
which is the traditional habeas corpus remedy. Federal writs of habeas corpus
may order a state to release a prisoner outright, but under the current system
most writs grant release conditionally-for example, by ordering a petitioner
released unless the state gives him a new trial.
Under the proposed model, a federal court that found a systemic violation
would still order conditional release, but in a more detailed way. The order
would set forth the evidence of a systemic violation of a constitutional right and
then give the state a choice: either (1) remedy the systemic error within a
reasonable period of time and apply the remedy to the instant petitioner's case,
or (2) release the petitioner.
If the state chooses option (1) but fails to remedy the problem, the federal
court would order the release of the habeas petitioner. If that happens, or if the
alleges a systemic violation on the basis of the new conditions is not a successive petition. Rather,
it is a new petition alleging a new systemic violation.
178. A decision in a pro se case that there was no systemic problem would not have
preclusive effect on future litigation. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 415, 432-33; see also Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1310 (1976)
(noting that public law litigation, because of its widespread impact, requires adequate
representation). For a discussion of how habeas petitioners will obtain legal assistance under the
proposed systemic habeas review system, see infra Section III.E.
179. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
180. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1.
181. Moreover, a federal ruling that there is an individual violation but no systemic
problem does not preclude that individual petitioner from filing different claims in state and
federal court. For example, depending on the state's procedural rules, some petitioners could file
additional postconviction actions in state court in an attempt to get relief. Others could petition for
an original writ in federal court. See discussion infra Section III.F. Some petitioners would also
opt to pursue civil damages or other forms of civil relief in state and federal court. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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state chooses option (2) outright, all future petitioners alleging that they were
victims of the same systemic problem would be fast-tracked in the federal
district court.182 Upon a finding of prejudice in each particular case, the federal
courts would issue the same order of conditional release. Thus, state prisoners
would be released on an expedited basis until the state fixed the problem.
Consider again the Oklahoma remand procedure for addressing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Suppose Petitioner Pete's trial lawyer was
completely ineffective, and Petitioner Pete's request for a remand to challenge
his attorney's conduct was denied. Petitioner Pete could file a federal habeas
petition alleging a systemic violation of defendants' due process rights in
Oklahoma and claiming that he was prejudicially affected by this practice.
Upon finding a systemic violation, the federal judge would send Petitioner
Pete's case back to the Oklahoma courts with an order requiring them either to
(1) release Petitioner Pete or (2) devise some new means of allowing
defendants to raise trial attorney ineffectiveness challenges and apply that new
procedure to Petitioner Pete. The order would include a date on which the case
would be reheard in federal court. At that date, the state would have to provide
the federal court with evidence as to what new procedure it had devised to
redress this constitutional problem and how that procedure had been applied to
Petitioner Pete.
Upon receiving this order, Oklahoma would have multiple options. First,
it could appeal the district court order and ask for a stay pending resolution of
the appeal. 183 However, assuming that the order is final or that a stay is not
granted, Oklahoma would still have other options. It could release Petitioner
Pete and maintain its practices. Oklahoma would know that the federal courts
would then expedite consideration of other petitions raising the same systemic
problem and send more and more of these cases back with similar conditional
release orders. But if Oklahoma believed that very few petitioners would be
able to show that the practice at issue prejudiced their case, it might choose to
release petitioners one by one.184 Alternatively, Oklahoma could choose any of
several new methods for handling ineffective assistance claims. It could
develop standards for deciding when defendants who raise such claims on
appeal should get hearings (and then apply those standards to Petitioner
182. There are a number of ways to expedite consideration of future claims. For example,
all future cases could be channeled to the same judge who issued the original order finding a
structural problem. Cf Garrett, supra note 14, at 441-43 (describing how Judge Weinstein in the
Eastern District of New York channeled all pending habeas corpus petitions to a single
decisionmaker).
183. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2251, 2253 (2006).
184. If a state chose to ignore the federal finding of a systemic problem and just risk the
release of petitioners one by one, the federal courts might respond by adopting a more defendant-
friendly interpretation of the prejudice component in individual cases so as to increase the
likelihood of a state response. Alternatively, criminal defendants from the state might attempt to
use the federal court finding of a systemic violation to pursue remedies under civil rights' statutes.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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Pete). It could move consideration of ineffective assistance claims to state
postconviction proceedings where evidentiary hearings are available (and give
Petitioner Pete an opportunity to file a new postconviction petition). It could
create an independent commission to analyze the merits of each ineffective
assistance claim and make recommendations to the judiciary about whether
hearings are appropriate. These examples are only illustrative. The point is that
the state would have a broad field of choice for how to alter its practices.
At the later federal court hearing, Oklahoma could explain how it had
fixed the problem, and the federal court would either approve the proposed
solution and dismiss Petitioner Pete's habeas action or tell Oklahoma that the
proposed solution was constitutionally insufficient. At that point, the court
would either order Petitioner Pete released or grant an extension to give
Oklahoma a second chance to develop a remedy. If an extension were granted,
the process would repeat until (1) Oklahoma came up with a constitutionally
satisfactory alternative, (2) Oklahoma chose to release Petitioner Pete, or (3)
the federal court ordered Oklahoma to release Petitioner Pete.
Requiring the federal courts to approve revised state procedures may seem
invasive, but it would not be new. Under the current habeas system, when a
federal court declares a state practice unconstitutional, the state must come up
with a new practice if it wants to avoid future grants of habeas relief.186 If that
new practice is presented to the federal courts in subsequent habeas petitions, it
will be struck down if it is not constitutionally adequate. The only innovation
proposed here is that the federal court would retain jurisdiction over a particular
case until the state either devised a constitutionally adequate alternative or
released the petitioner. Admittedly, this change might upset state officials. But
it also provides a more direct feedback mechanism than the current system, and
the resulting interaction between the state and the federal court should have
beneficial consequences. Once a state proposes a solution to a given systemic
problem, the state and the federal court would engage in a dialogue aimed at
finding a solution that adequately addresses the systemic violation. As
Professors Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff documented, such a
dialogue would be salutary given the respective strengths of the state and
federal courts. 87 State courts could educate their federal counterparts about
their pragmatic constraints, and the federal courts could then take those
constraints into account when interpreting federal law.188
185. See Primus, supra note 106.
186. Admittedly, some states choose to ignore the federal decision given the limited
number of cases that actually get to the federal habeas stage. See, e.g., supra note 117.
187. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
188. See id.
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A word is in order about the applicability of the retroactivity doctrine to
this proposed remedy. Under current doctrine, most new judicial decisions only
apply retroactively to cases that are not yet final-that is, those that have not
completed direct appellate review.189 The same principle would apply here. For
example, assume that Oklahoma's remand procedure prejudicially affected
Defendants 1 through 10, of whom Petitioner Pete was Defendant 4. For
whatever reason, Petitioner Pete was the first to file a habeas petition in federal
court. After Petitioner Pete filed, the nine remaining initial defendants also filed
petitions. Moreover, during the pendency of Petitioner Pete's federal habeas
action, the defective remand procedure prejudicially affected Defendants 11
through 20. Then, before the case of Defendant 21 arose, the state devised a
new and constitutionally adequate procedure in response to the federal court
order in Petitioner Pete's habeas case. Defendant 21 and all subsequent
defendants would get the benefit of the revised procedure. Petitioner Pete
would also get the benefit of the revised procedure as a reward for successfully
bringing the systemic challenge. In contrast, Defendants 1 through 20,
excepting Petitioner Pete, would not get the retroactive benefit of the revised
procedures unless their cases were still on direct appeal when the federal
district court approved of the new procedure. That may seem harsh, of course,
but it is no different from what would happen under current retroactivity
doctrine. 190 Moreover, it avoids the problem of asking a federal judge to release
entire groups of convicted criminals in order to improve a point of law. Judges
who would be required to apply their rulings retroactively might be reluctant to
find systemic state violations for fear of upsetting criminal convictions on a
large scale. 191 Allowing judges to use individual petitioners' cases as vehicles
to prompt forward-looking reforms gives them a softer stick that they will be
more likely to use and is less offensive to federalism principles.' 92
E. Access to Counsel
Access to counsel is imperative under a systemic habeas model because
state prisoners with limited investigative abilities must determine whether the
errors affecting them are in fact systemic. And they cannot rely on the work of
their trial or appellate counsel, given that those attorneys have no duty to
investigate and present systemic state challenges to the state courts.'93 More-
189. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989).
190. This analysis assumes that the federal court's finding of a systemic violation and
approval of a new state procedure would constitute a new ruling under Teague that would be
subject to the retroactivity bar. See id. at 301.
191. See Amsterdam, supra note 136.
192. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 889 (1999) (explaining that courts, which are reluctant to enforce rights with strong
remedies, may dilute the nature of the right to avoid the remedy if the remedy is perceived of as
too strong).
193. Cf Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (holding that there is no constitutional
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over, to the extent that federal court decisions about the existence vel non of
systemic state problems would have preclusive effects in future litigation,
counsel is necessary to ensure adequate presentation of systemic habeas
claims.194 As a result, state prisoners would need legal assistance to ensure that
this new habeas regime functioned effectively.
The cost of giving every state prisoner a right to an attorney would be
extremely high. For this reason, no branch of government has thus far created
an unqualified right to habeas counsel outside of the capital context.195 One
potential compromise would be to add a team of attorneys to the Special
Litigation Section in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.
These Justice Department attorneys would be responsible for investigating and
challenging systemic state practices that violated defendants' federal rights.
Prisoners could write letters requesting that the Department of Justice take their
cases, and Justice Department attorneys would pick the cases that were most
representative of serious systemic state problems. Justice Department attorneys
would be able to identify systemic problems, launch suits, persuade judges, and
monitor a state's attempts to make structural changes in ways that citizen-
petitioners could not.196 Moreover, the Justice Department could coordinate
state efforts to communicate with one another so as to prevent future systemic
violations.19 7 Creating a team of highly trained lawyers to search for and
challenge the most egregious state court practices could keep the costs under
control while ensuring quality federal habeas litigation.'98
Unlike a constitutional or statutory right to counsel for all habeas petition-
ers, creating a Justice Department Office is politically feasible as well as
fiscally palatable. Congress has authorized the Department of Justice to sue
police departments, mental hospitals, and housing authorities in order to ferret
out practices that systematically violate individuals' civil rights.199 For
right to counsel for discretionary appeals); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987)
(extending Ross to collateral attacks on criminal judgments after direct appeal).
194. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 415, 432-33; see also Chayes, supra note 178, at 1310
(noting that public law litigation, because of its widespread impact, requires adequate
representation).
195. See Finley, 481 U.S. 551; Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). Capital defendants
do have a federal statutory right to counsel in habeas proceedings, see 102 Stat. 4393 (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2006)), and if a federal evidentiary hearing is granted in their case, see
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); FED. R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 8(c).
196. See OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 22 (1978) (discussing the special
competenc.: of Department of Justice attorneys); see also David Zaring, National Rulemaking
Through Tr,'ql Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1055
(2004) (discu.,sing the economies of scale when the Justice Department is able to use the same
techniques acr.ss states).
197. See, ?.g., Zaring, supra note 196, at 1068 (explaining how the Department of Justice
developed on-line networks where information about prison, jail management, and best practices
was shared among states).
198. See Robert D. Dinerstein, The Absence ofJustice, 63 NEB. L. REV. 680, 690 (1984)
(discussing the quality of Justice Department attorneys).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006); id. § 1997 to 2000a-6.; Dinerstein, supra note 198, at
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example, Congress reacted to the Rodney King beatings and other high profile
instances of police misconduct by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which
authorized the Justice Department to sue for equitable and declaratory relief to
stop law enforcement officers from engaging in patterns or practices of conduct
that violate individuals' civil rights.2 00 Just as the Rodney King incident
catalyzed legislative reform in the police misconduct context, recent high-
profile accounts of egregious right-to-counsel violations could be used to spark
criminal justice reform.201
Although there are many advantages to creating a specialized team of
Justice Department lawyers, the political accountability that it would inject into
the decision to sue and seek relief could also have adverse effects.202 The
Department of Justice has not always been at the front line in combating
systemic civil rights violations. 203 Despite the widespread problem of police
brutality in inner city departments, for example, the Department of Justice has
filed very few § 14141 actions.204 Some of this may be attributable to different
administrations' political priorities.205 But it is also caused, in part, by the
Justice Department's unwillingness to sue local law enforcement agencies in an
era when federal-state cooperation is a component of most successful federal
206prosecutions. For similar reasons, we should expect the Justice Department
to be reluctant to attack systemic misconduct by state prosecutors.
680.
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
201. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al (noting that public defender caseloads are so heavy that defenders
have been forced to refuse to take on new cases). Alternatively, the recent spate of DNA
exonerations could be used to argue that constitutional rights have to be protected in order to
ensure that innocents are not convicted. See generally Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005). These arguments
have worked to bring about other forms of pro-defense legislation. See, e.g., The Innocence
Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006); see also Press Release, Senator Patrick S.
Leahy, Judiciary Panel Holds Second Hearing on Habeas Bill (Nov. 16, 2005) (describing the
Act), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200511/111605.html.
202. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1421.
203. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1409-10 (2000) (noting
that the Department of Justice only assigns twenty-six attorneys and fifteen FBI agents to the
Special Litigation Unit that is responsible for pattern or practice cases).
204. See id. at 1404 (citing only three).
205. See Matthew J. Silveira, An Unexpected Application of 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Using
Investigative Findings for § 1983 Litigation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 601, 613 (2004) (noting that
Presidents Clinton and Bush have used section 14141 differently); see also Dinerstein, supra note
198, at 681 (explaining how the Reagan Administration failed to enforce CRIPA); Gilles, supra
note 203, at 1411 (same).
206. See Gilles, supra note 203, at 1410-11.
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One potential way to address the financial and political constraints on the
Justice Department's effectiveness is to allow privately initiated suits to fill the
207gap. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 could be modified to allow civil rights
attorneys to recover reasonable fees from states that engage in systemic
violations. 208 And where plausible, prisoners could hire private attorneys or file
pro se petitions.
All attorneys or habeas petitioners not filing petitions through the
Department of Justice would be required to notify the department of their cases.
The notification process would include sending the Justice Department copies
of the habeas petitions and making it aware of any case in which the state
(1) agreed to release a habeas petitioner after a systemic challenge was filed, or
(2) attempted to bargain with a petitioner in order to avoid a systemic
challenge. In cases that settled, all discovery obtained prior to the settlement
would have to be made available to the Department of Justice.
Notification is necessary to prevent states from contracting around their
obligations to enforce federal rights. Once discovery or evidentiary hearings
begin to reveal a systemic problem, it is in the state's interests to bargain with
(or release) the prisoner so as to prevent the federal courts from granting a
conditional writ and fast-tracking future petitions.209 A notification requirement
ensures that the Justice Department is aware of the systemic state problem,
even if the state is successful in making a particular petition disappear. When
appropriate, the Justice Department could then find other representative peti-
tioners to serve as vehicles.
207. See id. at 1459-50 (noting that we can expect greater responsiveness where
investigation and litigation are funded by private parties); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174,
at 1419-20.
208. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 870
(2007) (discussing the role of civil rights lawyers as private attorneys general); Gilles, supra note
203, at 1451 (noting that these organizations have the resources and legal expertise, as well as
standing in the community, to bring legitimate petitions); see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550,
621 (2006) (explaining that civil rights organizations often partner with large law firms that would
commit additional resources).
One potential downside to this fee-shifting arrangement is that it will increase the cost of
structural reform to the state, because the state will have to pay attorneys fees in addition to
funding a remedial regime to redress its systemic problem. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006); THOMAS,
supra note 48, at 171-72; Schlanger, supra, at 1624. Oftentimes, states engage in systemic
violations of criminal procedure rights because they lack funding to fully and adequately enforce
them. See discussion supra Section II.B. 1. Adding to the financial burden of the state by forcing it
to pay attorneys fees makes it more difficult for the state to afford solutions. On the other hand, if
a state knows that it will be forced to pay attorneys fees in addition to paying for a remedy if it
waits for litigation to force a solution, it might act proactively to redress its systemic problems.
209. Thus, under the proposed habeas regime, settlements would be much more frequent
than under current law. See generally Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1 (2006)
(discussing the infrequency with which habeas cases are settled and proposing various reforms to
increase settlement rates).
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A notification requirement would also help Justice Department attorneys
develop expertise about the practices in each state.210 And critically, it would
prevent needless duplication of work. If a case settles after an extensive federal
hearing related to a state practice, the information from that hearing should be
made available to the Justice Department so that it does not start from scratch
in a future case raising the same challenge.21
F. Suspension Clause Concerns
It is worth saying a word about the possibility that a systemic habeas
approach would violate the Constitution's Suspension Clause212 by failing to
provide individualized review. Whether a suspension problem would in fact
arise depends on how expansively the Suspension Clause is read. To date, the
Supreme Court has said little on the matter.213 As a result, theorists have a
relatively wide open field in which to argue that suspension should be
understood one way or another. At one extreme, some scholars rely on early
Supreme Court dicta to argue that federal court jurisdiction to issue the writ to
state prisoners is not inherent; rather, to this group it is a matter of legislative
grace, and Congress could repeal the relevant statutes entirely without running
afoul of the Constitution.214 Others assert that the Fourteenth Amendment
broadened the scope of the Suspension Clause and obligated the federal courts
to provide habeas review to state prisoners.2 15 Obviously, a suspension problem
would only arise for the current proposal if the Supreme Court adopted the
210. See Zaring, supra note 196, at 1062-63 (discussing the benefits of having the same
attorneys handle these cases because those attorneys build links between cases which lead to
learning and standardization). Of course, a notification requirement would be unnecessary if the
Department of Justice had the ability and resources to monitor the filing and outcome of habeas
petitions in each state, and if the Justice Department had access to the discovery and evidentiary
hearing transcripts in those cases that went to the hearing stage. The notification requirement
assumes that there are limited resources that hamper the Justice Department's ability to obtain this
information in other ways.
211. Given the cooperative relationship between the Department of Justice and civil rights
organizations, see Livingston, supra note 174, at 821 n.23, I expect that the Justice Department
would share this information with civil rights organizations.
212. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
213. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 837.
214. See, e.g., Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605;
see also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1289-92 (2003) (emphasizing that Justice John Marshall stated, in Ex Parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), that federal court jurisdiction to issue the writ was not
inherent but must be conferred by statute).
215. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a
Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 862, 874-
78 (1994). Recent dicta from the Supreme Court provides support for the argument that the scope
of the Suspension Clause today is broader than it was at the time of the founding. See, e.g.,
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)
("[W]e assume, for purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution
refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.").
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latter understanding.
Even if the clause were held to guarantee some form of habeas review to
prisoners in state custody, the little that the Court has said about suspension
suggests that the present proposal would survive scrutiny. The clause clearly
permits some restrictions on the scope of federal review of state court
convictions, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court's removal of most Fourth
Amendment claims from federal habeas review in Stone v. Powell.216 More
generally, the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that limitations on habeas
review will survive scrutiny whenever there is an alternative form of adjudica-
tion that can serve as an adequate substitute for the Great Writ.217
Under the proposed systemic habeas review system, there are three
alternative forms of adjudication available to state prisoners for raising
individualized claims in federal court. First, a state prisoner could petition the
United States Supreme Court to take his case at the conclusion of direct review.
Second, he could again petition the United States Supreme Court to review his
case at the conclusion of state postconviction proceedings. And third, if there
were exceptional circumstances that justified issuance of a writ based on an
individualized claim, the state prisoner could file a petition in federal court
seeking an original writ of habeas corpus.218 Given the Supreme Court's small
docket and the rarity with which original writs have been issued, these
alternatives might not seem like much, but the Supreme Court may well
consider them to be enough. In approving a serious limitation on habeas
petitioners' ability to file successive petitions, the Supreme Court recently
emphasized that the theoretical ability to file an original habeas petition was
sufficient to demonstrate an adequate alternative, regardless of how likely the
Court was to entertain such a petition.219 As long as that orientation stands, the
proposed systemic habeas review system would not entail an unconstitutional
suspension.220
216. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
217. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229; Felker, 518 U.S. 651.
218. See Felker, 518 U.S. 651; see also SUP. CT. R. 20(a).
219. See Felker, 518 U.S. 651.
220. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 839-42 (arguing that these mechanisms might
provide an adequate alternative under their proposal). If the Supreme Court held that a purely
systemic form of federal habeas review violated the Suspension Clause, Congress could adopt a
two-tiered federal habeas system in which systemic claims would be reviewed in accordance with
the proposed systemic model while review of individual claims would be far more streamlined,
providing only the bare minimum necessary to avoid a Suspension Clause problem. Cf Garrett,
supra note 14, at 443-44 (arguing for two-tiered review in which substantive claims based on
predictable causes of wrongful convictions are given more review); Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note
25, at 691 (arguing for a two-tracked habeas system in which petitioners who show a reasonable
probability of innocence would receive de novo review of their federal claims).
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IV
THE POLITICAL VIABILITY OF SYSTEMIC REVIEW
Congress has been looking for ways to streamline federal habeas
review, 221 but no reform can succeed without a compromise between rival
political camps.222 One constituency wants to remove procedural obstacles to
relief and have federal courts vindicate substantive constitutional claims.223 But
another wants more stringent procedural default rules, more extensive harmless
error doctrines, and more limited appellate rights in order to conserve federal
resources and promote interests in finality and federalism. 224 The debate is
therefore at a standstill, despite the recognized need for reform.
Successful reform requires balancing these two sets of interests. First, the
new system must be more effective at deterring states from violating
defendants' criminal procedure rights. A system that is simply a "lottery for
lifers" is not worth the time and resources now expended on habeas review. 225
To be politically feasible, however, a reform that increases the federal courts'
ability to check state practices must be streamlined. It should conserve
resources, value finality, and respect federalism. In this Part, I explain how
systemic habeas review effectively advances both sets of goals.
A. Improving Deterrence
Reorienting federal habeas review to focus on systemic errors would more
effectively deter states from committing constitutional violations.226 As
221. See sources collected supra notes 1 & 72 (noting that Senators Kyl & Kennedy both
believe that habeas corpus law needs to be reformed); see also Streamlined Procedures Act of
2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?
bill=s109-1088 (most recent proposal for reform); H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005).
222. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 1, at 543-46 (describing the many proposals for reform
that were made before AEDPA and the stalemates in Congress that prevented their enactment);
see also Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl09-1088 (proposed by Senator Kyl, the bill
never passed); H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005).
223. See, e.g., Statement by Senator Patrick Leahy, Executive Business Meeting, Senate
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200510/
100605.html (objecting to the obstacles to habeas corpus relief contained in the Streamlined
Procedures Act); 151 CONG. REC. S12,801 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(advocating for passage of the Innocence Protection Act of 2004), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200511/111605.html.
224. See, e.g., Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl09-1088; see also Press Release, Senator
Jon Kyl, Limiting Endless Death Penalty Delays (July 18, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR
11247996; 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (daily ed. May 19, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (complaining
because "many Federal habeas corpus cases require 10, 15, or even 20 years to complete" and
noting that victims "cannot be expected to 'move on' without knowing how the cases against the
attacker has been resolved").
225. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 1, at 810.
226. Cf Garrett, supra note 14, at 447-48; see also Lee, supra note 153, at 200 (noting
that, under the current system, the threat is not sufficient to deter).
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discussed above, eliminating the exhaustion requirement would give more
defendants a realistic opportunity to seek federal relief.227 And the corrective
orders that these defendants would obtain would have a more powerful
deterrent effect because they would come closer in time to the original
violations. Rather than ordering states to release a few prisoners whose rights
they violated years before, federal courts would send live, systemic issues back
to the states.228 The threat of fast-tracked petitions and waves of conditional
release orders would alter state incentives so that reform would be in the best
interests of state policymakers. 229 But the federal hand need not be too heavy:
the proposed remedy allows the federal courts to push the states toward best
practices while giving the states room to experiment and to use their local
230knowledge to craft effective and lasting solutions.
B. Conserving Resources and Valuing Finality
As described earlier, habeas review today is redundant and wasteful.
Federal judges spend a great deal of time denying petitions on procedural
grounds, and in the rare cases in which they reach the merits, they often do no
more than re-adjudicate issues a state court already analyzed and then defer to
the state's decision. Modifying federal habeas to address systemic state viola-
tions should make it more useful and less redundant. Rather than focusing on
individual error correction, which is what the appellate review system is
designed to do, federal habeas courts would have something distinctive to add:
the analysis of whether the state is violating federal rights systematically.
Once that initial determination is made, federal review would be stream-
lined in ways that would conserve federal resources. Specifically, if a state
failed to correct a systemic violation, the federal courts would fast-track future
petitions and conduct streamlined standing inquiries to determine who should
get habeas relief. This streamlined process would make more efficient use of
scarce resources and would make it possible to eliminate the exhaustion
requirement, thereby making habeas review available to more criminal
defendants without unreasonably taxing the federal courts. If the systemic
challenge were rejected or if the state remedied the systemic problem, the ban
227. See supra Section III.B.
228. See Semeraro, supra note 27, at 929 (noting that deciding the merits of an issue rather
than sending it back to the offending state court "improperly let[s] the state court off the
constitutional hook that should require it to treat federal law as the supreme law").
229. See Jeffries and Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1416 (noting that structural reform
litigation places problems on the agenda for political reform by calling the problems to the
attention of the other branches of government); Vidhya Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The
Role ofSystemic Litigation in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel 33 (Wash. U. Sch. of
Law Working Paper No. 1279185), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1279185; see also id. at
21-22 (noting that, in response to litigation efforts in 2003, the Georgia state legislature passed the
Georgia Indigent Defense Act creating a statewide indigent defense system in Georgia).
230. See Livingston, supra note 174, at 845 (discussing how section 14141 consent decrees
do the same thing).
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on successive petitions would prohibit other petitioners from raising the same
challenge, assuming adequate representation of the petitioners' interests by
effective counsel in the first case.231 Thus, by precluding needless relitigation, a
systemic habeas review system would provide meaningful review to more
defendants while at the same time valuing finality and conserving federal
resources.
C. Respecting Federalism
Federalism does not require giving the states all possible autonomy.
Rather, it entails striking a proper balance between state autonomy and federal
oversight. All federal habeas review rests on the idea that the federal
government must exercise some supervision over state courts,232 but federal
habeas should not unnecessarily compromise state autonomy. A federal habeas
system that focused on systemic state violations would better protect both
interests in the federalist balance, permitting more state autonomy than the
present system while improving the quality of federal supervision.
If federal review is predicated upon a showing of a statewide systemic
problem, most state judgments will stand. Only a repeated failure to enforce the
Constitution or federal law would overcome the presumption that the state is
entitled to operate without federal interference. When a state systematically
flouts federal law, the deference appropriately shown to the state courts is at its
nadir. It is more respectful of the state courts to limit federal intervention to
such situations than it is to allow federal courts to review every state court
criminal conviction for individualized errors.
The remedy I propose here is also more respectful of state autonomy than
most other potential remedies. The state is informed of its systemic problem
and given the choice of how-or even whether-to fix the problem. Often, the
proposed remedy would also be less offensive to individual state officials than
the current system. Currently, granting habeas relief requires a federal judge to
tell a particular state judge that she made a mistake. In contrast, a systemic state
problem often emerges because of the action (or inaction) of multiple actors.233
In such cases, the responsibility for the problem is more diffuse. No individual
state actor is singled out by the federal courts, which is arguably less
demeaning to state judges than the current system. 234
231. Cf Multiparty Habeas, supra note 84 (noting that, if a constitutional claim is raised in
the case of one individual and is denied, the question is settled).
232. See Hammel, supra note 5, at 50 ("[T]he very existence of federal courts and most
federal jurisdiction is based on a distrust of state courts.").
233. See supra Section II.B.
234. See Semeraro, supra note 27, at 929. This would not be true for a systemic dilution of
a constitutional right by a state court judge. In such cases, there is a state court judge who could
take umbrage at a federal finding of systemic violation. That said, one federal finding that a state
judge's interpretation of the federal constitution is wrong and creates a systemic problem is less
offensive than multiple individual findings by different federal courts that his interpretation of the
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SYSTEMIC HABEAS REVIEW AS STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION
Any attempt to have federal courts use habeas corpus to restructure state
criminal justice systems is likely to face the same criticisms that other forms of
structural civil rights litigation have encountered. In Section V.A, I explore
these criticisms and explain how they have resulted in a narrower and less
intrusive form of structural relief in other contexts. I also discuss why structural
reform litigation is a natural tool to redress states' systemic violation of crimi-
nal defendants' constitutional rights and why a systemic habeas review system
captures many of the benefits of structural reform litigation without some of the
costs. In Section V.B., I explain why alternative forms of structural relief-
including section 1983 litigation, federal enforcement actions, and habeas class
actions-are not as well-suited to redress this particular systemic problem as a
systemic habeas form of structural relief.
A. The Arc of Structural Reform
1. Old Structural Reform
After Brown v. Board ofEducation,235 a new form of public law litigation
emerged in which civil rights plaintiffs sought forward-looking relief from
federal courts in the form of broad, negotiated judicial decrees requiring state
political institutions to restructure in order to comply with federal law. 236
Schools, jails, mental hospitals, housing authorities, and police departments
were all subject to continuing federal judicial supervision under these
237decrees. Because federal judges are insulated from political pressure and can
tailor solutions to particular situations without having to address generalized
problems through bureaucratic channels, some scholars believed that federal
courts were better positioned than legislatures or administrative agencies to
provide structural relief. 3 1
Nonetheless, the structural reform movement was controversial from its
inception.239 Some critics believe that such judicial intervention offends
principles of federalism and violates the separation of powers doctrine.240
Structural reform litigation might bypass democratic decision-making
processes and allow unelected federal judges to play God in areas where they
federal law is wrong and merits the granting of multiple habeas corpus petitions.
235. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
236. See Chayes, supra note 178.
237. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1413; Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts
as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949, 949 (1978).
238. See Fiss, supra note 196; Chayes, supra note 178, at 1307-09.
239. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (2004).
240. See id. at 1017; see also Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform
Injunction: Oops ... It's Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 158-59 (2003).
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have no real expertise.241 To make matters worse, critics argue, the federal
decrees resulting from structural reform lawsuits often involve sweeping,
elaborate, and detailed remedies that extend beyond remedying unconstitutional
conduct and require significant appropriations of state funds.242
Defenders of structural reform litigation emphasize the fox-guarding-the-
henhouse problem that arises when the political branches are responsible for
ensuring that state and local institutions respect individuals' constitutional
rights.243 Federal judicial intervention is necessary, they argue, precisely
because the political branches have failed to protect countermajoritarian
rights. Moreover, they contend, the argument that structural reform litigation
bypasses democratic decision-making processes ignores the involvement that
the political branches have in the process of creating remedies. 245 As for the
objection about the appropriation of state budgets, defenders of structural
reform litigation emphasize that every judicial order implies an allocation of
public funds sufficient to enforce it. Sometimes the enforcement costs are
246substantial, and sometimes they are not. Moreover, each time structural
reform injunctions have been issued, legislatures, agencies, or
nongovernmental organizations have readily volunteered the requisite
resources.247
2. Kinder, Gentler Structural Reform
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court substantially limited structural
reform litigation by restricting the availability of injunctive relief248 as well as
the breadth of injunctive remedies. 249 The Court also encouraged lower courts
241. See Gilles, supra note 240, at 161; Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1387.
242. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1387; Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at
1017.
243. See Gilles, supra note 240, at 160.
244. See Fiss, supra note 196, at 60; Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1399-1400;
Zaring, supra note 196, at 1025 n.49.
245. See Zaring, supra note 196, at 1028; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at 1091
(noting that the remedial schemes are often created with substantial input from the legislatures).
Defenders of structural reform litigation also point out that state officials often welcome these
lawsuits, knowing that a federal court order will insulate them from political responsibility for
taking a desired but politically unpopular action. See THOMAS, supra note 48, at 70; Dinerstein,
supra note 198, at 688; Mishkin, supra note 237, at 958; Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at 1063,
1065; see also Schlanger, supra note 208, at 563 (quoting a jail administrator: "To be sure, we
used 'court orders' and 'consent decrees' for leverage. We ranted and raved for decades about
getting federal judges 'out of our business'; but we secretly smiled as we requested greater and
greater budgets to build facilities, hire staff, and upgrade equipment. We 'cussed' the federal
courts all the way to the bank.").
246. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at 1059.
247. See id. at 1082.
248. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 380 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-99 (1974).
249. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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to terminate long-standing consent decrees.250 As a result, federal judges are
now less likely to create comprehensive remedial regimes regulating the details
of a state institution,251 and many scholars today regard structural reform
litigation as largely a thing of the past.252
That conclusion, though common, is too quick. Structural reform litigation
remains an important part of the work of the federal courts. It would be more
accurate to say that a command-and-control style of structural injunctive relief
has been largely replaced by a less intrusive and more experimentalist
approach, one more focused on identifying goals that defendants are expected
to achieve and outlining standards for measuring their performance in
achieving those goals.253 In that spirit, courts today are more likely to try to
encourage the parties to craft flexible and provisional decrees.254 These decrees
often call for data collection, monitoring and reporting, the development of
performance measures, and ongoing stakeholder participation in the remedy.2 5 5
Current structural reform decrees tend to be narrower and less intrusive than the
decrees of the past, but federal courts still use structural injunctions to shape
institutional reform.2 56 Hundreds of school districts and prisons continue to
operate under judicial supervision today.257
B. The Fit with Criminal Procedure
Even in its softer modem form, structural reform litigation is not effective
everywhere. As Myriam Gilles, Charles Sabel, and William Simon have shown,
recent structural reform litigation appears most effective when there is broad
consensus within legal intellectual circles258 that underrepresented minorities'
constitutional rights are being violated and that such violations are
intolerable.259 In such circumstances, structural reform is the only way to
remedy a systemic constitutional violation, because majoritarian political
control is unresponsive to the needs of the minority community.260
250. See Garrett, supra note 208, at 871.
251. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1410-12.
252. See id.; Schlanger, supra note 208.
253. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1410-12; Sabel & Simon, supra note
239, at 1019; Schlanger, supra note 208, at 568.
254. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1410-12; Sabel & Simon, supra note
239, at 1019, 1067-72.
255. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1410-12; Sabel & Simon, supra note
239, at 1067-72; Schlanger, supra note 208, at 568.
256. See Garrett, supra note 208, at 872.
257. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at 1018; Schlanger, supra note 208, at 554;
Zaring, supra note 196, at 10 19-20.
258. Legal intellectual circles would include judges, lawyers, academics, and other elites in
the legal and political community more broadly. See Gilles, supra note 240, at 147-48.
259. See id. at 147-49; Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at 1062.
260. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1389; Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at
1064; Russell L. Weaver, The Rise and Decline of Structural Remedies, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1617, 1631-32 (2004).
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As I have detailed in this Article, criminal defendants' constitutional
rights are routinely violated in state criminal courts. Criminal defendants are a
despised minority with no real political power. Politicians, meanwhile, are
unwilling to spend money on criminal justice reforms. Consequently, if there is
no judicial intervention, state criminal justice systems will continue to
systematically deprive defendants of their constitutional rights.261 Admittedly,
popular fear of crime and of releasing criminals makes structural reform more
difficult here than in some other contexts. 262 But that does not mean it is
impossible. Instead, it means that any proposal for structural reform must
proceed incrementally, taking into account the political difficulties inherent in
effectuating systemic change.
The federal judiciary is well positioned to effectuate criminal justice
reforms. In fact, it is better equipped to redress systemic state violations of
criminal procedure rights through structural reform than it is to redress other
problems-like school segregation and prison condition violations-for which
structural reform has already proven effective. After all, stopping criminal
procedure violations is about the federal judiciary checking the state judiciary.
It is not about reforming schools, prisons, or other institutions with which
federal judges have less experience. It is about reforming a justice system,
which is something that federal judges know a lot about. Indeed, if the issue is
how to reform a justice system, federal judges are at least as competent as
legislators and executive branch officials, and they are probably more realistic
when assessing what can and cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of
time. On institutional competence grounds, federal courts are thus better
equipped to bring about the kinds of policy changes that systemic habeas
review would call for than they are to intervene in other areas where structural
reform litigation currently operates.
C. Alternatives to Systemic Habeas
1. Section 1983
The federal causes of action that are typically used for structural reform
litigation-42 U.S.C. § 1983 class actions and federal enforcement actions-
are not well-suited to allow prisoners to file suit to stop states from
systematically violating criminal procedure rights. Consider first the limits of
263
section 1983. Criminal defendants must have their unconstitutional
convictions reversed before they are entitled to recover monetary damages
261. Cf id. (making a similar argument about prisoners).
262. Cf Sabel & Simon, supra note 239, at 1043 (noting that acceptance of institutional
reform litigation in policing has been slower than in other areas because there is a popular fear of
crime that makes judicial intervention seem costlier and riskier).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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through section 1983 suits.264 Moreover, state judges, who are frequently the
individuals engaging in the systemic violation of criminal procedure rights, are
absolutely immune from civil damage suits for actions performed in their
official capacities.265
The path to equitable relief is not much easier. Some litigants would have
difficulty meeting section 1983's heightened standing requirements for injunc-
tive relief.26 6 Those who have standing are likely to be barred by statute from
obtaining equitable relief against judicial officers unless declaratory relief is
unavailable.267 Moreover, abstention doctrines keep federal courts in section
1983 suits from enjoining or providing declaratory relief in pending state court
criminal proceedings 268 and from reviewing state court decisions after the
fact.269 Nor may incarcerated persons use section 1983 to end or shorten their
terms of confinement.270 Instead, under existing doctrine, litigants seeking
release from confinement must resort to habeas corpus.271
Finally, the pleading requirements make it difficult to achieve systemic
state reform in the criminal justice system through a section 1983 action.
Because there is no vicarious liability in section 1983 lawsuits, states have been
272held to be inappropriate defendants. As a result, plaintiffs filing section 1983
lawsuits must sue individual officers for relief.273 Such rules are problematic in
the context of redressing systemic state violations of criminal procedure rights.
Systemic problems regularly exist because of the action or inaction of multiple
state actors, which compromises the defendant's ability to name each
individual responsible for the alleged problem. Moreover, to the extent that the
defendant is able to name each person, the number of defendants involved is
likely to be high in many cases, resulting in more complex litigation and
requiring more federal judicial time, energy, and resources. For all of these
reasons, current section 1983 litigation is not an adequate vehicle through
which to vindicate claims of systemic state violations.
Of course, Congress could retool section 1983 and attempt to address all
of the foregoing problems. There are prudential and constitutional reasons,
264. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
265. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see also Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 317, § 401, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
266. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 380 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-99 (1974).
267. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 § 401.
268. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
269. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
270. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 44 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
271. See id.
272. See Schlanger, supra note 62, at 1676 n.391.
273. See THOMAS, supra note 48, at 167 (noting that many civil rights complaints are
dismissed for failure to adequately name the specific persons who are responsible for the alleged
violations).
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however, why a structural habeas solution would be better than a modified
section 1983 action.
First, there are important differences between the remedies available in
habeas actions and those available through section 1983 litigation. The tradi-
tional habeas remedy--conditional or outright release of a single petitioner-is
less likely to raise federalism concerns and create the kinds of problems that
characterized early efforts at judicially imposed structural reform than the
injunctive relief associated with section 1983. The fact that the relief provided
by the federal court is individualized (that is, that conditional orders of release
come one by one) makes it more politically palatable for a judge to grant relief.
There is no requirement of immediate relief for all affected prisoners, and the
state is not ordered to take expensive and time-consuming action. Rather, this
Article's proposal gives the state the option of releasing prisoners and taking its
time to think about how, and even whether, to devise a more comprehensive
remedy. Compare this remedial approach with the remedies available under
section 1983 where, even if the offending state institution plays an active role
274in crafting remedial orders, an unelected federal judge is still forcing the
state to enact reforms. In contrast, a judge who orders a habeas petitioner
released does not bypass democratic institutions in the states and does not force
the state to enact reforms, because the state does not have to enact any reforms.
Instead, the threat of more conditional release orders gives the state an
incentive to fix its procedures in its own way. The offending state can choose a
judicial, legislative, or executive solution to the problem or can just opt to leave
the problem intact and release prisoners whose rights were prejudicially
affected. This system is more deferential to the state than a judicial order
instructing the state to change and specifying how the reform must proceed.275
Of course, Congress could create a modified section 1983 action with the
conditional release remedy proposed here, but release from confinement is the
quintessential remedy for habeas actions. The difference in remedies is one of
the key distinctions between habeas and section 1983, and this proposal's use
of the traditional habeas remedy is one of its central features. It therefore makes
sense to locate this proposal in the framework of habeas rather than that of
section 1983. Moreover, federal habeas review is currently broken and in need
of reform in ways that section 1983 is not, so if one is going to reform one
framework or the other, habeas is a more logical candidate. The redirection of
currently wasted federal resources from the old habeas system to a revised and
more effective one ought to be more politically palatable than the creation of a
new section 1983 cause of action designed to help a politically unpopular
minority.276
274. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
275. See Mishkin, supra note 237, at 964.
276. To be sure, Congress could decide to repeal section 2254 entirely and redirect the
resources that were previously devoted to federal habeas review to a new modified section 1983
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In addition to these prudential reasons why reforms might be better
located in habeas than in section 1983, there may be constitutional reasons to
prefer a modified habeas corpus system. Consider the timing of the respective
actions. Section 1983 actions can be filed before, during, or after a state court
proceeding, whereas habeas actions under section 2254 must wait until after
trial.277 The timing is important because there are potential constitutional
limitations on interference in ongoing state court criminal proceedings that
would apply to many section 1983 actions but not to habeas actions.
In Younger v. Harris,278 the Supreme Court relied on principles of comity
and federalism to hold that the federal courts must abstain from enjoining or
providing declaratory relief in pending state court criminal proceedings. Most
experts believe that Younger abstention is a prudential doctrine,279 but some
have argued that implicit limits on federal judicial power contained in the
Supremacy Clause, Article III, and the Tenth Amendment constitutionally
require Younger abstention.2 80 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
question, and if it were to address it today, it would probably agree with the
majority of commentators that the doctrine is prudential. But the conditions
under which the Supreme Court would confront that question would be
considerably different if Congress enacted a modified section 1983 statute
designed to redress systemic state violations of criminal defendants' rights in
pending cases. If every criminal defendant who wanted to allege pretrial that
his appointed public defender was ineffective could file a federal action, the
federal courts would be inundated with cases. Given that 80 percent of criminal
defendants are represented by public defenders, 2 81 any federal ruling that there
was a structural problem with the provision of indigent defense services would
freeze the entire state criminal justice system. To the extent that there is any
argument that Younger abstention is constitutionally required, the onslaught of
federal filings and the potential disruption of an entire state criminal justice
system would make the argument attractive to an overburdened federal
cause of action. However, eliminating federal habeas review of state criminal convictions entirely
is likely to pose a greater potential constitutional problem under the Suspension Clause than
would a limitation of federal habeas review to systemic claims. See supra Section III.F.
277. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (listing no time restrictions), with 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a) (2006) (requiring that a prisoner be held pursuant to a state court judgment before the
prisoner can file for federal habeas relief).
278. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
279. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on
the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 261-65 (1992).
280. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial
Power of the United States, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 812-43 (1991); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 13.2 at 828-29 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining that it is an
open question whether Younger abstention is constitutional or prudential and summarizing the
arguments on both sides).
281. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 815 (2006) (citing Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, BUREAU
OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Feb. 1996, at 4).
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judiciary concerned with maintaining the federalist balance.
Congress could avoid this potential constitutional problem by requiring
defendants to wait until after their state cases have been fully resolved to file
challenges under its new civil rights statute. But, under that scenario, Congress
runs the risk of confronting another potential constitutional problem: standing.
The Supreme Court has held that a private citizen wishing to vindicate his
rights under a civil rights statute only has standing under Article III to bring a
claim for injunctive relief in the federal courts if he can show that he has
sustained a real and immediate injury that has continuing and present effects.282
Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional
standing requirements. 2 So if litigants wait too long to file their civil claims
and their sentences have expired, they may no longer be suffering from the
effects of the alleged constitutional violation and will, as a constitutional
matter, not state a case or controversy under Article III.
The best way for Congress to avoid both of these potential constitutional
problems is to craft a statute that allows defendants who are still suffering from
the effects of their criminal convictions-that is, defendants who are still in
custody-to file post-trial attacks on their criminal convictions. And Congress
has already drafted that statute: it is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, governing federal habeas
review of state criminal convictions.
2. Federal Enforcement Actions
Instead of a modified section 1983 action, Congress could create a wholly
new federal enforcement action designed to redress systemic state violations of
criminal defendants' constitutional rights. Patterned after section 14141,284 such
legislation would make it unlawful for any state or state official to engage in a
pattern or practice of conduct that deprives criminal defendants in that state of
their rights under the Constitution. It would also give the attorney general the
power to sue in federal court and obtain appropriate equitable relief whenever it
has reason to believe that a state was in violation.285
A federal enforcement action is attractive for a number of reasons.
Because the executive is not constrained by the Supreme Court's decisions
282. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1982) (holding that the plaintiff
did not have standing to challenge the police department's chokehold policies because he could
not show that he was suffering from an injury with present effects); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
372 (1975) (holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the allegedly racially
discriminatory practices of the police because they could not show a present injury); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-97 (1973) (holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the allegedly racially discriminatory practices of the criminal courts in setting bond,
sentencing, and establishing jury practices because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate any injury
to them).
283. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1975).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
285. See id.
2010] 51
HeinOnline  -- 98 Cal. L. Rev. 51 2010
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
regarding redressability, equitable standing, and generalized grievances, it can
avoid the standing problems that plague other civil rights statutes.286 Moreover,
a statute that provides for a federal enforcement action does not raise the same
abstention concerns as a statute that authorizes citizen suits. A citizen suit
provision would allow every criminal defendant who wanted to allege that his
constitutional rights were violated as part of a systemic state practice to file a
federal action. The federal courts would be inundated with cases, and there
would be no check on frivolous claims.287 In contrast, giving the Department of
Justice the authority to file an action in a limited number of cases allows a
small number of suits to go forward-enough suits to fix the problems, but
without the onslaught of filings that would come with an unchecked private
cause of action. Finally, the involvement of the United States carries a certain
gravitas that the federal courts take seriously. As a result, when the Department
of Justice has filed enforcement actions in other contexts, it has often brought
the offending state officials to the negotiating table.288
That said, there are also some significant drawbacks to a federal
enforcement action. Perhaps most important among them is the political
accountability that it would inject into the decision to sue and seek relief.289 As
described above, relying solely on the Department of Justice to institute
enforcement actions has not been effective in other contexts due to resource
constraints, different administrations' political priorities, and hostility to the
underlying claims.290 For these reasons, any federal enforcement action would
have to be supplemented with a modified habeas or section 1983 cause of
action in order to be effective.
3. Habeas Class Actions
If habeas reform is the appropriate tool for redressing systemic state
violations, one might also consider reviving the habeas class action.29' Such
class actions would achieve many of the same benefits as the proposed
systemic habeas system. Aggregation of common claims would preserve
judicial time, energy, and resources and would ensure that habeas petitioners
had counsel to raise their common claims.292 If successful, habeas class actions
would provide states with strong incentives to end systemic violations of
286. See Gilles, supra note 203, at 1447.
287. See id. at 1384, 1452 (discussing the failure of citizen suits provisions to provide any
check against frivolous claims).
288. See id. at 1404-06 (describing how all of the lawsuits that the Department of Justice
filed under section 14141 have resulted in consent decrees)
289. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 174, at 1421.
290. See discussion supra Section III.E.
291. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 388 n.15 (noting that for two decades federal courts
certified habeas class actions); Multiparty Habeas, supra note 84 (arguing for habeas class
actions).
292. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 409.
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constitutional rights.293
That said, using the class action for this purpose has important limits.
Aggregating habeas claims without reforming the procedural obstacle course
and the deferential merits review that now constitute the habeas process would
leave in place many of the shortcomings that currently prevent habeas relief
from deterring systemic state violations. Exhaustion rules would drastically
limit the number of petitioners able to obtain habeas relief and increase the
delay between state violation and federal feedback. Because habeas class
actions would merely aggregate individual claims rather than changing the
nature of the merits inquiry, the shift to habeas class actions provides no
grounds for eliminating the exhaustion requirement. In a habeas class action,
the state retains its interest in having an opportunity to redress the violations at
issue before the federal court intervenes, particularly given that there is no
suggestion that asking for state relief would be futile. 294
The question of remedy raises further problems for class actions. Federal
judges are generally reluctant to order the immediate release of large numbers
of convicted criminals.2 95 As a result, judges might be reluctant to find
constitutional violations in class actions and indeed might dilute constitutional
standards to avoid such findings.296 The problem is particularly acute because a
mandatory habeas class action would include absent class members. Thus,
when the federal court granted relief, it would be granting relief to all prisoners
who are potentially affected by its ruling.297 In contrast, the proposed systemic
habeas review system provides relief to only one petitioner at a time, and
retroactivity principles limit the potential scope of each federal decision.298
Finally, there is the question of political feasibility. Reviving the habeas
class action might garner support from those in Congress who are interested in
using habeas review to protect individual rights, but it would receive little
support from those interested in conserving federal resources and promoting
finality and federalism. Given that there is not enough political support to
ensure full relitigation of individual claims, it is hard to imagine that Congress
would be willing to fund an expanded habeas review system that adds a second
layer of systemic habeas review on top of the current individualized review
system.
293. See id. at 443.
294. See id. at 408.
295. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 136.
296. See, e.g., Hammel, supra note 5, at 77 (referring to this concern as the "legitimation
effect").
297. See Multiparty Habeas, supra note 84, at 1507 (noting that according benefits to all
habeas class members may create a disruption in the administration of criminal justice which
nonretrospective decisions are in part designed to prevent).
298. See discussion supra Section III.D.
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4. Aggregation in State Courts
Another possible alternative to a systemic federal habeas system would be
to look entirely outside the federal judiciary. In a recent article, Brandon
Garrett has promoted the idea of aggregating claims in state courts across a
299
variety of contexts. As Professor Garrett shows, important benefits flow from
a court's considering many instances of a legal problem, whether the particular
aggregation is in the form of a class action, the consolidation of cases, or the
channeling of a certain kind of case to a repeat-player judge.300 Professor
Garrett's analysis is illuminating, and it is accordingly worth considering
whether the aggregation of criminal procedure claims in state courts would be a
desirable method of redressing systemic violations of defendants' constitutional
rights.301
A system of state court aggregation of such claims could prompt reform.
Presenting aggregated defendants' claims through state class actions or consoli-
dated appeals might force state judges to see and rule on systemic problems
that they currently ignore. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that
states have an incentive to adopt these procedures on their own.302 Systemic
state violations exist because of the failure of all three branches of state govern-
ment. The right-to-counsel crisis, for example, exists in many states because
state legislators underfund the public defender's office, public defenders do not
provide effective assistance of counsel, prosecutors and trial judges do nothing
to stop it, appellate and postconviction judges either ignore or refuse to address
the problem, and the executive does not fix it. If any one of these state actors
stepped in to remedy the situation, it would prevent the development of a
systemic problem. Given that the systemic problems in need of correction are
by definition tolerated by state courts, it might be overly optimistic to expect
state judges to embrace state class actions or consolidated appeals that would
bring the problems into focus. If one is trying to remedy a systemic state
problem, it is more realistic to look outside the state. 303
299. See generally Garrett, supra note 14.
300. See id.
301. Professor Garrett does not limit his argument for aggregation to the state court
context, but for the reasons discussed supra Section V.C.3, I do not believe that procedural
aggregation of claims in federal habeas would be as effective in checking systemic state violations
as the proposed systemic habeas review system.
302. To be sure, there are examples of aggregation in criminal cases, but they are the
exception rather than the rule. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 410-20 (describing instances of state
aggregation).
303. That said, the proposed systemic habeas review system might give state courts an
incentive to create aggregation mechanisms in order to redress systemic problems before they
reach the federal habeas courts. If so, the benefits of state-court aggregation that Professor Garrett
describes might be brought to bear.
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5. Executive or Legislative Solutions
Even if it is appropriate to seek the solution to a systemic state problem at
the federal level rather than expecting the state to correct the violations itself, it
does not necessarily follow that the best federal officials to provide the solution
are judges. Importantly, however, the kind of systemic failures at issue here
concern the enforcement of criminal procedure rights. Criminal defendants
have no lobbying power and therefore are poorly positioned to bring these
issues to lawmakers' attention as they arise.304 More importantly, federal
executive and legislative officials are unlikely to pass multiple pieces of
legislation designed to protect criminal defendants' rights for fear of being
labeled as soft on crime and not winning reelection. 305 Given limited time and
resources, legislative and executive officials are more likely to champion
education or health care reform than to argue for expanded rights for alleged
criminals.306
To be sure, there is much debate about the degree to which federal judges
embrace countermajoritarian views in order to preserve individual rights. 307
Many federal judges are hesitant to intrude on their state court brethren and
upset state criminal convictions.308 And given the implications of finding a
systemic state problem, judges might be more willing to redress individual
304. See 1972-2006 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY ON CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
(2006), available at http://sda.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/hsda?harcsda+gss06 (indicating that an over-
whelmingly large majority of people surveyed believe that courts treat criminals too leniently).
305. See Rebecca Zeifman, Backlogged DNA Tests Keep Hopes on Ice: Victims, Wrongly
Convicted Anxiously Await Resolution, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Oct. 12, 2004, at 3A
(noting that legislation to fund DNA testing in capital cases was "stalled in the Senate because of a
provision that allocates $350 million to improved legal representation in death penalty cases,"
legislation that the Department of Justice and others called "soft on crime"); see also Donald A.
Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 252 (1997) ("Legislatures, responding to voters fearful of crime, have no
incentive to devote scarce resources to [criminal] defense. . . ."). Of course, certain issues-i.e.,
the right-to-counsel crisis or DNA exonerations-could spark an act of legislative reform that
gave federal courts jurisdiction to entertain systemic claims. See discussion supra note 201 and
surrounding text. However, it is unrealistic to think that Congress would be willing to enact
individual reforms for each systemic problem that arises in a state.
306. See Charles Babbington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed
by Bush: Constitutional Challenges Predicted, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A01 (noting that
Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter voted for a bill that would strip detainees of habeas corpus
rights even though he believed the bill to be unconstitutional); see also Michels, supra note 106
(noting that Florida State Senator Victor Crist, when asked about budget cuts to the indigent
defense system in that state, indicated that the legislature had no choice and stated, "Do we cut the
schools? Do we cut health services? Everybody has to share in the reductions.").
307. Compare ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 116 (2d ed. 1986) (espousing limited role of federal courts due to
countermajoritarian difficulty), with Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 577, 667-68 (1993) (questioning the extent and force of the claim that federal courts are
countermajoritarian).
308. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501-02 (1974); Fiss, supra note 196, at 65;
Hamrnmel, supra note 5, at 40.
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errors than systemic ones. 309 That said, federal judges are certainly more
insulated from political pressure than the executive or legislative branches. The
premise of federal habeas review is that federal judges should oversee state
court operations to the extent necessary to protect constitutional rights.310 Of
course, some federal judges will refuse to take seriously a congressional man-
date to review state court criminal decisions, but the same attitudes that animate
such a judge will exist in the legislative and executive branches as well.
CONCLUSION
At its inception, federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal
convictions was designed not just to correct individual errors but also to check
systemic state disregard for constitutional rights. That vision has faded over
time. Today, judges and scholars who disagree about many aspects of habeas
corpus share the assumption that the point of habeas is to remedy individual
violations, and their disagreements concern which individuals should be
entitled to relief-those who are actually innocent, those who were not afforded
fair process, or those who had certain preferred rights violated. The struggle
among these positions has created an unwieldy maze of procedural obstacles
that currently prevents habeas from acting as a meaningful check at the
systemic level. As a result, many states now violate criminal defendants'
federal rights not just with impunity but also as a matter of routine.
This Article demonstrates that restoring the systemic mission of federal
habeas review of state cases could both repair the federal habeas system and
redress practices by which states systematically violate defendants' federal
rights. Many who read this proposal may be skeptical-both about the
proposal's feasibility and about its ability to spur reform if enacted.
Admittedly, any attempt at systemic reform poses challenges as our experience
with structural reform litigation in the civil context demonstrates. And the
challenge is particularly difficult when the reforms are designed to benefit
criminal defendants.
That said, the systemic problems in our criminal justice system are
growing in both number and magnitude. The national media is beginning to pay
attention, and congressional committees are forming to consider these
problems. 312 As a separate matter, Congress has long been interested in fixing
309. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 136; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
501-02 (1974) ("[A] major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into
the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable
restraint which this Court has recognized. . . .").
310. See Hammel, supra note 5, at 50 ("[T]he very existence of federal courts and most
federal jurisdiction is based on a distrust of state courts.").
311. See, e.g., Eckholm, supra note 201; Amir Efrati, It's Rare for Prosecutors to Get the
Book Thrown back at Them, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2009, at All.
312. See, e.g., Press Release, National Legal Aid & Defender Association, NLADA's
David Carroll to Testify in Historic Congressional Hearing on Topic of Right to Counsel:
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the broken federal habeas system. The systemic habeas review system pro-
posed here offers Congress the opportunity to address both of these concerns.
Just as one important function of the individual's right to vote is to
prevent the systemic distortion of political power, one important function of the
Great Writ is to prevent states from ignoring defendants' federal rights
systematically. A federal habeas system that required petitioners to demonstrate
that they were prejudicially affected by a systemic state practice in order to
obtain relief would go a long way toward fulfilling that function, and it could
also go a long way toward reducing the waste and redundancy that plague
habeas review today.
Congressional Hearing to Focus on Failings of Public Defense Systems, with Emphasis on
Michigan, as Exposed in a Recent NLADA Report (March 19, 2009), at http://www.nlada.org/
News/NewsPressReleases/2009031959108246.
313. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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